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Abstract 
 
Since tragic on-campus suicides like those of Elizabeth Shin, there has been a call from 
the community for sensible mental health policies to be developed at Canadian 
universities. Mental health policies in Ontario universities are still in development and 
what is currently being used in place of dedicated policy documentation is often cold and 
legalistic, or simply inappropriate for use with mental health issues. The research 
surrounding mental health policy in higher education is limited, as the issue of mental 
health in policy appears to have only recently become a point of discussion. In this study, 
I attempt to create that discussion, addressing legalistic and neo-liberal trends in policy. 
To this end, I compiled the developing frameworks and existing policies from 13 major 
universities across Ontario (i.e., the institutions with more than 10,000 students) and 
examined them for precisely these neo-liberal trends. I conclude by arguing that current 
procedures for handling mental health issues (including the use of student codes of 
conduct and no-harm contracts) are not humanistic but, instead, bureaucratic. I also note 
that some of the currently developing mental health policies show many of the same 
tendencies. I caution policy makers to consider a more humanistic approach to mental 
health policies if on-campus tragedies are to be avoided. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Mental Health and Canadian Universities 
 
 Quality mental health services and viable mental health policy are major concerns 
for modern Canadian universities and it has become increasingly apparent that current 
solutions do not have long-term sustainability. At the very least, the mental health 
resources of most universities are not sufficient to address the problem in any meaningful 
way. An article by Maclean's Magazine notes that this last decade has seen an incredible 
increase in student demand for mental health services (Luneau, 2011). Suicide is still the 
leading cause of death in young adults in Canada, after motor vehicle accidents and on a 
university campus such tragedy is all the more visible (Luneau, 2011). And yet, despite 
the statistics, the nature of the problem is somewhat difficult to grasp. To illustrate: At 
Toronto’s Ryerson University, counseling centres saw a nearly 200 % increase in student 
patients in 2011 and students faced nearly four times normal wait periods as a result (up 
to 8 weeks to for a first appointment with a counsellor). Ryerson is only one such 
instance of a nationwide problem where counseling centres are overburdened, yet 
researchers on the topic of mental health refer to the prevalence of suicidality among 
university students as “the silent problem” (Wynaden et al., 2014). The label may seem 
ill fitting but it is in fact quite descriptive: Despite the high numbers of incoming cases, 
students quickly give up on counseling centres and statistics show that few students 
bother to come forward with their problems at all. Surveys of university students, 
according to a Yale study, have shown stable proportions of mental illness since as early 
as the 1920s—there is no sudden crisis, merely a sudden awareness that the problem has 
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always existed (Wei, 2007). Assuming the quality of care is sufficient at campus mental 
health centres, there could be a number of reasons for the silence and why there is still 
trouble breaking it—among those reasons are the aforementioned wait times. With an 
overburdened system and wait times approaching months, students may simply grow 
frustrated and try to handle their issues on their own. And while counsellors report that 
students are coming forward with more severe illnesses than in previous years, surveys of 
mental health indicate that these students are not actually seeking help at counseling 
centres. In fact, counseling centres are being filled out by students who do not suffer from 
mental illnesses at all (Wei, 2007). 
Let me pause here to define mental health and mental illness, an important 
distinction in the context of this discussion. The Canadian Mental Health Association, 
Ontario (CMHA, 2015) defines mental health as “a state of well-being in which the 
individual realizes his or her own abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can 
work productively and fruitfully and is able to make a contribution to his or her 
community” (para. 1). Conversely, the CMHA defines mental illness as “a recognized, 
medically diagnosable illness that results in the significant impairment of an individual’s 
cognitive, affective or relational abilities” (para. 2). Note that the CMHA definition of 
mental illness uses the term “medically diagnosable illness”, and this thesis concerns 
students with serious mental issues that may or may not be diagnosed. I am by no means 
making the claim that all serious mental issues are diagnosable illnesses, nor am I 
claiming that suicide is in and of itself a mental illness. I do make the claim that 
suicidality and mental illness are correlated strongly, and that suicide is often a symptom 
of mental illness, but suicidality is not the totality of the student wellness problem on-
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campus. The important point to gather from these definitions is that suffering from 
mental illness does not mean one has poor mental health, indeed, one can suffer from 
mental illness and have good mental health. For instance, individuals with depression 
could still excel in managing their life and stresses that arise despite their symptoms and 
have little need of mental health intervention (though they would still need treatment for 
the symptoms of their illness). While I ascribe to a medical model of mental illness (the 
idea that mental illnesses have largely biological explanations and should be treated in 
much the same way as physical illnesses with regards to treatment and diagnosis), the 
distinction between mental illness and mental health is still relevant in the more popular 
biopsychosocial model (which is typically adopted by universities). The biopsychosocial 
model of mental illness argues social (cultural and environmental) and psychological 
(emotional and behavioural) factors play as important a role in mental disorders as 
biological factors. My bias towards the medical model should be noted through the 
course of this paper. It is not the purpose of this review to argue in favour of the medical 
model over the biopsychosocial model but at points I do criticize the overreliance on 
psychological and social explanations of student behaviour in university policy. Equating 
the terms mental health and mental illness runs the risk of assuming that treating one is 
treating the other. There is a danger for policy makers to create blanket policies (that is, 
an overly broad set of guidelines) that address mental health issues but fail to mention 
issues of mental illness. Note that while this thesis often uses the term “mental health 
policies,” this is only because that is how the universities themselves typically refer to 
these documents, despite the inclusion in these documents of issues that very much 
involve the mentally ill. Also note that in over 90% of suicide cases, the victims were 
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suffering from mental illness (Mann, 2002). Treating suicidality and self-harm in higher 
education needs to involve a discussion of mental illness in some way, not merely mental 
health. 
So, to return to the problem at hand, counseling centres report that more students 
with serious mental illnesses are enrolling in universities than in previous years but very 
few of these students see them for treatment (Wei, 2007).  Counseling centres are full of 
students with mental health issues but they treat a disproportionately low number of 
students with mental illness relative to the population of university students. Initiatives 
and programs that encourage students to come forward appear to do little to help the 
seriously ill if the students cannot be treated before their disorder affects their school 
performance. These initiatives do even less good if they are aimed solely at those 
suffering from poor mental health, perhaps explaining the discrepancy between the 
number of students with a diagnosed mental disorder and the number of mentally ill 
students seeking help on-campus. Despite programs and awareness campaigns promoting 
mental health, those with mental illnesses may feel as if the facilities are not equipped to 
handle the severity of their issues. There are, of course, other explanations for the lack of 
counseling attendance. Given the busy schedule of students, they may not even have time 
for regular appointments. There could even be financial reasons. Working students may 
be afraid that the centres will recommend medical leaves or pharmaceuticals that their 
insurance may not fully support. But perhaps a more likely reason that students seem to 
be afraid to come forward or follow up on treatment is due to stigma—both perceived 
stigma prior to seeking help and stigma encountered after doing so. After all, mental 
illness is only very slowly becoming a socially acceptable topic, and remains at the centre 
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of some controversy. Some universities seem to have trouble finding the right way to 
address the problems when they arise and understandably so—these issues can raise 
potentially embarrassing questions regarding the suitability of care provided by the 
institution.  
 Consider the case of Jack Windeler, a student at Queen's University in Kingston, 
who was the victim of suicide on March 26
th
, 2010. In the months that followed 
Windeler's death, three more cases of suicide arose at Queen’s and the string of tragedies 
caught the public eye. The deaths of Windeler and his peers pointed to an inadequacy in 
counseling services at the university. Soon, students began sharing their own 
dissatisfaction with the school's mental health service, noting an inability to contact the 
office by e-mail, dismissive staff and a wait time of months (Er-Chua, 2010).  Queen’s, 
of course, had to address these issues that were now made public but even in reporting on 
Windeler's death, it needed to be careful. There was some commentary on the university's 
online report on the tragedy that criticized the university for being open with the cause of 
Windeler's death, which argued that suicide should not be made public knowledge and is 
in some way a more sensitive and private affair than other means of death. While the 
parents were, in fact, supportive of the university's honest stance regarding their son's 
death, the idea that one must tiptoe around the topic of suicide is unfortunately common.  
In 2008, under the leadership of the American College Health Association, the 
Higher Education Mental Health Alliance was formed to address, among other things, 
proper responses to suicide on the part of colleges and universities and policies those 
institutions could then implement. Their guide, titled “Postvention,” recommends having 
friends and roommates limit social media communications until after the death has been 
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officially reported and to then use “safe messaging” to reduce the risk of “contagion” (p. 
11). Contagion, in this case, refers to the idea that following an incident of suicide, it is 
more likely for other students to also die by means of suicide. Indeed, the guide suggests 
that any reports within the campus itself default to not confirming that the cause of death 
was suicide where possible (pp. 11–12). Unfortunately, this kind of policy doesn't 
promote open dialogue, which is a large part of why the silent problem is, indeed, silent. 
One can almost understand the caution on the part of administrators and policy makers. 
Suicide cases can mean a lot of liability for universities if legal action is pursued and 
since high-profile cases like that of Elizabeth Shin in 2002, institutions have chosen to err 
on the side of caution—at least where it concerns their own legal safety. 
 As I examine policy through this paper, I intend to move from a broad discussion 
of policy in Ontario higher education to the means in which policy is enacted, narrowing 
the focus as I progress. In this way, I hope to move from a broad theoretical base to a 
grounded depiction of how policy functions in practice. I will introduce the nature of the 
problem and its origins through a case study (particularly, the case of Elizabeth Shin, 
whose death spawned a wave of policy reform). I will then discuss the particulars of the 
policies themselves, selecting from a small sample of publicly available documents from 
Ontario universities (and one notable document from a university in Quebec). My 
research has yielded only a limited number of these policy documents—however, this is 
to be expected. After all, mental health policy is a relatively new topic and many 
universities are still in the process of developing and understanding policy. The 
documents that I have highlighted are, I feel, representative of the fledgling and cautious 
nature of modern mental health policy. While I will trouble the language used in these 
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policies to a limited extent, I do not seek to comment on their effectiveness in this 
section. Instead, my intent is to illustrate the legalistic and perhaps vague nature of these 
policies. From there, I will use the work of theorists Michael Power and Michael Apple 
to help put these documents and trends into perspective. Both Power and Apple argue 
that neo-liberal values dictate policy decisions in higher education and I make the case 
that mental health policy is no exception. Bureaucratic traditions and systemic capitalist 
values are likely giving rise to the trends of legalistic policy discussed in later chapters. I 
will then tighten the focus further to discuss the concepts and values higher education 
institutes intend to portray through their policy documents. This discussion will take 
place through the lens of a single policy concept: in particular, the concept of in loco 
parentis. Finally, my argument converges on the tools used to enact the aforementioned 
policy concepts. I note that even reasonably presented (though legalistic) ideas like the 
enforcement of in loco parentis can be executed in ways that would seem to run counter 
to a well-intentioned policy. For one reason or other, the values and conceptual goals of 
mental health policies do not always emerge in practice. This chapter will focus on a 
single policy tool by way of example: the problematic antisuicide contract. Some of the 
issues with this tool are discussed in brief in Chapter Two of this paper.  
Much of the focus in this paper is on suicide and self-harm as a representation of 
the kind of issues policy needs to address, because policy has been shaped around these 
issues on-campus. Policy reform seems to coincide with high profile tragedies on-
campus, hence the discussion of the pivotal Shin case, which influenced policy across all 
of North America. The problem lies in what kind of policy develops in reaction to 
tragedy—is it policy that removes the problem from campus or policy that encourages an 
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on-campus resolution? Further, mental health is an area that policy seems to handle 
adequately, when policy exists at all. Issues such as suicide and self-harm reveal 
weaknesses in policy that a broader view of mental health issues would not—particularly, 
whether policy makers even address mental illness as a potential link to on-campus 
tragedy. 
The broad to narrow, theoretical to concrete structure of the paper allows me to 
examine emergent policy, focusing on the true product that results from policy decisions 
on a higher level. In this way, I hope to illustrate not only the higher level neo-liberal 
thought that informs these documents but the very real, grounded consequences of policy 
decisions. When I speak of emergent policy, I refer to the informal, often unspoken and 
unwritten, problem-solving methods that act in place of formal, agreed-upon policies. 
Emergent policy is somewhat the opposite of explicit policy: commonly understood, 
vague, and unwritten. Emergent policy is, by and large, the current operating standard for 
mental health issues in Ontario Universities. I argue that emergent policy, when it comes 
to mental health issues, is no substitute for good policy documentation, and that the over-
estimation of existing resources is ultimately detrimental to anyone seeking help for 
mental health issues on-campus. It is my hope that this review can help inform future 
policy and avoid tragic cases like those of Jack Windeler or Elizabeth Shin. 
The Case of Elizabeth Shin  
 In 2002, the parents of Elizabeth Shin, a victim of suicide 2 years prior, sued her 
university (Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT]) over negligence regarding the 
death of their child. As a $27.65 million lawsuit, it certainly attracted a considerable 
amount of attention and all those involved knew the outcome of the trial could deeply 
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impact the way universities and colleges thought about and handled mental health issues. 
While the trial was eventually settled out of court, the fear of legal consequences stuck 
with higher education institutions. 
 When Shin started her studies at MIT, she was already entering the school with a 
brief history of mental illness—minor depressive symptoms had emerged during her 
senior year of high school (Shin et al. v. MIT, 2002).  During the first year of her 
program, Shin's symptoms worsened and she reported her distress to the school. Her 
symptoms included self-harm and suicidal ideation and it was during this time that she 
was hospitalized for attempting to overdose on codeine and Tylenol. Her care at MIT 
consisted of appointments with the campus mental health services every 2 weeks. 
However, the psychiatrist she was seeing dismissed Shin as having what he called 
situational issues—that is, mere trouble adjusting to the stresses of campus life—and 
recommended little more than a self-help book to assist with her difficulties. It would be 
another year and a considerable worsening of her symptoms before Shin was diagnosed 
with borderline personality disorder and depression through a new psychiatrist at MIT. 
Even with a more serious diagnosis and a more attentive psychiatrist, Shin's health 
deteriorated throughout the year, as reported through her peers and residence don. 
Despite expressing a wish to no longer live in the dorm, mental health services 
discouraged this idea and instead recommended she continue the lengthy process of being 
treated on-campus. Social workers at MIT began the several month process of setting 
Elizabeth up with therapy programs and appropriate medication, while she continued to 
see a psychiatrist on-campus. Elizabeth agreed to try the planned programs once they 
could be arranged. On the evening of April 8
th
, however, Shin informed another student 
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in her dorm that she felt she was a serious danger to herself. During this severe 
depressive episode, Shin was taken to mental health services. After the on-call 
psychiatrist evaluated her for less than 5 minutes (over the phone), he dismissed Shin on 
the grounds that he didn't believe she was a serious risk to herself. Shin was sent back to 
her dorm without any further follow-up. On April 10
th
, she informed a dorm resident that 
she was going to die that day and requested that her computer files be deleted 
postmortem. Alarmed, the student informed a residence don, who in turn informed the 
head psychiatrist. The psychiatrist was convinced that nothing serious was going on, 
since he believed Shin's friends had overreacted during the incident two nights prior and 
that Shin was not acutely suicidal. He sent the don to check on her but informed the don 
that there was no need to take the student in for medical care. The don remained 
concerned and after a troubling phone conversation with Shin (who repeated her suicidal 
ideation), the don once again contacted mental health services, only to be referred to a 
different psychiatrist that Shin had been seeing. The psychiatrist noted that he was going 
to be attending a meeting where Elizabeth's case would be discussed and he assured the 
don that the phone conversation would be brought up. The only further contact with 
Elizabeth that day was a voice mail message left by the psychiatrist, indicating that he 
would be available to contact that night. That night, Elizabeth's room was engulfed in 
flame. While Elizabeth likely disabled the sprinkler system in her room, as it did not 
activate, the smoke alarm in her room quickly alerted other students to the danger. 
Unfortunately, help did not arrive fast enough for Elizabeth. Suffering from extensive 
burns across her entire body and considerable brain damage from the fire, Shin finally 
succumbed to her injuries on April 14
th
. Her death was ruled a suicide. No other students 
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were harmed in the incident. 
 The case against MIT relied in part on the idea that the university set forth a 
number of expectations for their mental health services that they failed to uphold, 
entering into something of a verbal or implied contract with the Shin family that they did 
not follow through on. The court found that since MIT did not have policy outlining its 
responsibility to the student, it was difficult to argue that there was a specific promise or 
contract to Shin or her family that may have been violated. Indeed, the brochures and 
information provided to Elizabeth at the beginning of her studies were found to be “vague 
and indefinite” in what the university promised to provide students (Shin et al. v. MIT 
2002, p. 14).  Further, the court saw evidence to suggest gross negligence on the part of 
the medical staff may have been a merited charge (the defendants had called for summary 
judgement; this was denied in consideration of the evidence). With the medical staff 
facing their own charges, the question was, then, whether the administration would be 
absolved of the blame. The defence argued that the administration itself owed Shin no 
duty of care but rather this was solely the responsibility of the medical professionals on 
staff. And yet, while the defence's claims had merit in the eyes of the court, the court 
ruled that a special relationship existed between Elizabeth and the administration—
members of the administration were aware of the problem and were responsible for 
referring the student to the campus's medical services. It was clear that the administrators 
would be involved in the charges levelled against MIT. If the trial had continued to 
completion, it is unclear what this would have meant for the level of responsibility 
universities have towards student well-being and mental health. 
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 With the full benefit of hindsight, it is easy to say that Shin was suffering from 
much more than just situational issues and that her problem should have been treated as 
the serious medical issue that it was.  Of course, after spending so long in the care of 
professionals, one would expect at least some amount of foresight on the part of her 
caretakers, especially considering Shin was nothing if not forthright with her intentions.  
Should the psychiatric professionals involved in treating Shin or the university itself be 
held accountable for the student's death? And if Elizabeth was deemed a significant 
danger to herself on April 10
th
, what action could (and more importantly, should) have 
been taken to ensure her safety both in the immediate sense and in the long term? If 
anything, these questions could have been answered by solid mental health policy 
documents. While one cannot claim policy would have prevented the tragedy, it would 
have aided in the mess that followed. 
Mental Illness and Suicide 
Before proceeding into my discussion of policy, I believe it may be helpful to 
elaborate on the topic of mental illness and suicide. Earlier in the introduction, I argued 
that any discussion of mental health policy would be lacking without some mention and 
understanding of suicide, especially if the goal of said policy is to curb youth suicide 
rates. But understanding suicide is a tall order and a topic big enough for another thesis 
entirely. With this in mind, I will be limiting this discussion to a few key expert opinions 
that have informed my understanding of suicidal behaviour and mental illness (aside from 
my own academic background in the subject matter).  
Of note is Emile Durkheim (1897/1951), founder of the French school of 
sociology and author of Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Durkheim’s text was 
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foundational—it was one of the first to discuss the issue of control and choice when 
dealing with mental illness and suicide. Durkheim toys with the idea that the perceived 
motivation for a suicide (or even the outright stated motivation) may not be what it 
appears to be. Indeed, he raises the possibility that subtle disorders of the mind may be so 
disorienting and insidiously tormenting that the victim, in his or her confusion, attributes 
his or her internal distress to some external but trivial misfortune. This is the reverse of 
some of the traditional sociological models, whereby a series of misfortunes coupled with 
poor life coping skills leads to the formation of mental disorders (in those that have the 
genetic predisposition for such disorders). In this model, the existing mental disorders 
actively impair rational thought, intensifying any emotional event, such that the eventual 
suicide can seem to be caused by something trivial. When a young adult fails a university 
class and attempts suicide, one assumes that the obvious motivating factor would be the 
failing grade. But this is not necessarily the case and Durkheim’s idea should give pause. 
Of course, Durkheim entertains other possible models of suicidal behaviour and makes 
no solid conclusions concerning this branch of thought.  
But many leading suicidologists have picked up where Durkheim left off and 
seem much more confident in the medical model of suicide than Durkheim (who, despite 
his musings, had a more biopsychosocial view of suicide). Prominent among them is Dr. 
Douglas Jacobs, a Harvard-affiliated psychiatrist, national expert on suicide and editor of 
The Harvard Medical School Guide to Suicide Assessment and Intervention (1998). 
Jacobs has argued outright that "not all depressed people have thoughts of suicide but all 
people who are suicidal usually are depressed, which is why treatment is essential" (Help 
Yourself, Help Others, 2010). He emphasized these views again in an interview for the 
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Globe, in response to a number of teen suicides in February 2014: "[Jacobs] stressed that 
teen suicide occurs primarily among a small subset of young people who suffer an 
underlying psychiatric illness—usually depression. And such illnesses, he said, are often 
treatable” (Harmon, 2014, para. 8). This muddies the idea that suicide is a choice: if 
illness underlies the act, what does this mean for policy? If Dr. Jacobs is correct, until the 
underlying mental disorder is treated, suicide is a constant threat, regardless of life 
circumstance.  
Unfortunately, it is likely Elizabeth Shin’s own motivations were misunderstood 
in the time leading up to her suicide. Shin’s psychiatrists talked with her at length about 
stressors such as parental pressures and grades and when those problems were addressed, 
they assumed the problem had gone away. Policies that deal directly with self-harm must 
ensure that in addition to addressing stress and life skills (which are undoubtedly 
important parts of mental health in general), they also address the likely underlying 
mental illness. Policy must be preventative, not reactive. 
Creating Policy 
 
 Historically, where there have been failings in mental health policy, student 
organizations have led the efforts for reform. In the early 1960s, mental health programs 
were practically nonexistent in Canadian universities until lobbied for passionately by 
students (Jasen, 2011). It is because of their efforts that a discussion of mental health 
policy can even be had. This connection between students and policy reform has 
weakened over time but has not disappeared. Students at McMaster University, for 
example, have developed COPE, a mental health initiative focused on awareness and 
education. COPE works closely with the university to promote reform and to improve 
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policy (Sarjoo, 2015). With this long association with mental health reform, are students 
once again the answer to changing policy for the better? While it may be true that 
students are not afflicted by the same legal caution as administrators, student unions can 
be as ignorant of the issues afflicting their peers as any policy maker. They are, after all, 
not medical professionals (even if they are the population the policy will most directly 
influence). One also has to wonder what power modern student organizations hold—can 
the mental health overhaul of the 1960s really happen again through student involvement 
alone? I feel that while it is not the key to the puzzle of policy reform, it is important to 
consider the student perspective moving forward. 
 Since the conclusion of the trial surrounding Elizabeth Shin, the issue of quality 
mental health policy has been brought to light but much has been left unresolved. With 
no final ruling on the duty of care for higher education institutions, these organizations 
were left in fear—what was there to protect them were there to be another lawsuit in 
which the administration was, in fact, deemed responsible for the death of a student? If 
the law was unclear, there at least needed to be some measure of internal consistency in 
the event of another tragedy. Since the Shin case, there has been some literature (though 
not a great deal) surrounding what exactly effective mental health policy on-campus 
should look like. While the Shin case was American, Canadian universities shared much 
of the same reactions as American institutions well into the decade (Michaluk, 2008). 
The Elizibeth Shin case was monumental for university policy well beyond the United 
States, as it marked a change in how universities perceive the duty of care—an issue 
relevant regardless of the institution’s location.  
Currently, there exists a debate between those who would suggest it is not the 
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university's place to intervene in cases of suicidal and/or mentally unwell students (or at 
the very least, they are not legally accountable for the actions of those students) and those 
who insist the university must take responsibility in caring for the mental health of their 
students at all levels of operation. To state it less kindly, the debate is between policy that 
protects the institution versus policy that favours quality student care. Authors such as 
Susanna Dyer (2008) have said that universities must be careful to implement policy that 
directs students away from nonclinicians (professors and deans) and towards actual 
counseling services. Dyer, a doctor of law, exists firmly in the former camp, insisting that 
universities not be held responsible for suicides among their number. Her argument is a 
legal one: The ability to foresee a mental health issue is simply not enough, by the letter 
of the law, to hold someone accountable for not trying to prevent it. Nonclinicians should 
not have a duty of care and a university is not a care facility. Therefore, she concludes, 
mental health policy has to be implemented carefully to ensure legal ramifications are 
avoided. Her opponents argue through case studies and suggest that trying to avoid legal 
backlash is understandable, an even greater problem is created in practice. When trying to 
avoid a repeat of the Elizabeth Shin case, many Canadian universities (including some 
Ontario institutions) implemented mandatory and involuntary withdrawal policies for any 
student they believed showed suicidal tendencies. Some use existing policy to try to treat 
mental health issues with disciplinary action. Some administrators argued that students 
suffering suicidal ideation (or who had attempted suicide) were violating existing policy 
by causing harm or conspiring to harm a student, despite the fact that the only student at 
risk was the student him or herself (Wei, 2007). After cases emerged where several 
students without any actual suicidal ideation were forced to withdraw, it became clear 
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that these programs were more about trying to make the problem disappear than finding 
actual help for mentally unwell students (Baker, 2014). Authors such as Gary Pavela 
(2006) conclude from this that universities need to prioritize quality care over simply 
avoiding liability and that responding to mental distress with discipline is more 
irresponsible than any charge the university could seek to avoid. 
 The literature currently frames this debate as institutional rights versus the rights 
of mentally ill students. Through the literature review that follows, I intend to delve in 
depth into the nature of these arguments, both legal and emotional. Within the literature 
review and in the discussion that follows, I hope to illustrate the dangers of legalistic 
policy that protects only institutions. I will review policy documents that are largely still 
in development and highlight areas where these documents prove to be reactionary rather 
than preventative. It is not within the scope of this research to attempt to solve these 
complex legal issues or to suggest viable policy solutions (although I may note other 
authors who have offered some suggestions during the course of my review). While I 
may trouble the current dismissive language surrounding mental health in universities, 
my purpose is to understand what concepts and tools are currently in place to implement 
and enact policy. Ideally, policy serves to apply university values to programs and 
services carried out on-campus and to ensure these programs and services meet certain 
standards of quality. If there is an issue with the quality of student care, rather than 
manage and inform an entire network of services and departments, a formal policy 
document can help ensure nothing is lost in communication. 
 When a document of this nature exists, how does one determine the quality of 
that document? For that matter, how much does practice suffer without a formal policy 
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document? I intend to determine this through several key questions. Do the tools through 
which policy is enacted align with the concepts outlined in those policies? What policy 
concepts and theories form the basis of mental health policy in major Ontario universities 
(i.e., those with student populations of at least 10,000 students)? Ultimately, I hope to 
present an accurate picture of mental health policy in Ontario universities, note which 
institutions are lacking a formal mental health policy document and what guidelines may 
be serving in place of an overarching document. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Mental Health and a Duty of Care 
 Among scholarly literature in the field of education, mental health (especially as it 
concerns organizations and their policies) has only recently become a mainstream topic 
of concern. It may be that scholars are only now, in this decade, able to come out from 
the taboo surrounding mental illness and are willing to talk about the uncomfortable 
topic. This is especially true when university researchers must ask their own institutions 
the embarrassing questions concerning the quality of their mental health care policy. 
Mental health in education research may be emerging due to increasing public awareness 
surrounding campus mental health. Indeed, much of the literature that is available comes 
from the United States and the bulk appears to be in response to a number of high-profile 
tragedies: a series of school shootings and lawsuits surrounding student suicides on 
prestigious university campuses. These highly visible issues seem to have motivated 
researchers into examining exactly how institutions of higher learning have been 
handling issues of mental illness. The question has become increasingly public—what are 
colleges and universities doing to help students with mental health problems? For that 
matter, do these institutions, morally or legally, have a responsibility to care for those 
students? And while the United States has found itself rapidly changing and critiquing 
policies in an attempt to address these questions, Canada, too, has been swept up in the 
pressure. Canada has adopted much of the same reactionary policy as its southern 
neighbour. This silence is problematic at best—the lack of critical literature makes 
revising and developing new policy difficult, to say nothing of judging the effectiveness 
of existing policy—and this is ultimately a loss for the students. Not only does this mean 
that students may be receiving out of date or poor quality care but without proper policy, 
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nothing protects students from negligent or outright discriminatory behaviour. 
And, indeed, this is precisely what has been happening. While the scholars may 
be silent, the news media is rife with unfortunate case studies in which failing mental 
health policies have made victims out of already suffering students. A recent Newsweek 
article collected quite a number of these stories from universities in the United States 
(Baker, 2014) and the callous policies on display are unsettling to say the least. These 
stories raise a number of concerns, from issues of policy overriding student privacy, to 
students forced to sign documentation dictating an unreasonable counseling schedule (or 
else be withdrawn from their studies), to schools acting harshly in response to mental 
health issues that may not even exist, to students simply being punished for seeking help. 
How can any institution valuing mental health allow such ethical failings? These case 
studies and the policies they highlight will be examined in greater depth later in this 
review to find out how such counterintuitive (yet sometimes well-intentioned) policy 
could come about. Indeed, through this review, I will take what little literature does exist 
and attempt to form a coherent picture of the state of mental health policy in Ontario 
universities and with this in mind, I will try to predict what any future policy reform may 
look like.  
 Despite the long silence from researchers concerning mental health, student 
mental health is a serious issue that could use documentation to guide the parties 
involved. Students with mental health difficulties are likely to have their studies severely 
impacted. A large portion of those afflicted with mental illness drop out of college before 
graduation, while in a 2010 study, 92% of students reported that their work suffered as a 
direct result of their mental illness (Reavley & Jorm, 2010). This is, of course, to say 
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nothing of the increased suicide risk for students with mental disorders—suicide remains 
the leading cause of death for young adults across North America, after motor vehicle 
accidents (Luneau, 2011). Such a highly visible problem should be a priority for higher 
education care facilities and indeed, universities and colleges are certainly beginning to 
publicly implement responses to the issue. Unfortunately, many of these undertakings are 
lacking in substance. Public opinion may be influenced by awareness campaigns, mental 
health weeks and increased mental health expenditure at universities but without solid 
policy to back up these initiatives, they are little more than lip service to a serious issue. 
Authors Reavley and Jorm have agreed that this kind of so-called treatment may be 
problematic at best. The researchers tested the effectiveness of a variety of postsecondary 
mental health programs from among the most common responses to the mental health 
crisis. These included online-based initiatives (including social media awareness 
campaigns), stress-reduction strategies and traditional on-site counseling programs. They 
found that:  
Relatively few interventions to prevent depression or anxiety were identified and 
the majority of these were cognitive—behavioural/skill-based interventions. 
However, there is very limited evidence that such interventions are effective in 
preventing depression and anxiety disorders in the long term and they are time 
consuming and costly to implement. (p. 139)   
They examined depression and anxiety alongside alcohol abuse, the latter of which 
proved much more treatable through awareness campaigns and social media. Conversely, 
individuals suffering from mood disorders showed mixed results, at best, even when 
attending ordinary counseling services.  Indeed, it is a mistake to think that one can 
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undertake a project to address mental illness the same way one would run an awareness 
campaign to stop students from smoking. Or, at least, it is premature to assume mood 
disorders respond in the same way to treatment as issues of stress and dependency. 
 If these initiatives are short-sighted (or at worst, impractical), how does one go 
about developing long-term policy solutions that don't appear to be mere band-aid fixes? 
First it must be determined what is inadequate about our current strategies. And with on-
site counseling services seeing so poor a rate of returning patients, there is little that can 
be done to determine the long-term success of care. To be clear, on-campus counseling 
has seen a steady increase in patients across Canada in the last decade but after the first 
counsellor visit, student attendance drops off dramatically until, by the third visit, the 
likelihood of a fourth is nearly zero (Quinn, Wilson, MacIntyre, & Tinklin, 2009). This 
means that students are being treated superficially (it is unlikely that one, or even three 
counseling visits would be enough to treat anything but the most minor of issues), or else 
students have found reason not to continue seeking help. This is perhaps not 
unsurprising—maintaining commitment to one's support, among other pressures, is more 
likely to be a challenge for students suffering from mental health problems (Quinn et al., 
2009). But the real issue here may be one of stigma. Quinn et al. also reported that 
students felt that even their general practitioners were dismissive of the serious nature of 
their mental health issues and this may create a fear of seeking help among students or 
the belief that their problem is not serious enough to warrant assistance. However, while 
this does mean that on-campus support is all the more important, as it may be the only 
help students are receiving, it does not explain why students abandon counseling once 
they (supposedly) are met with more understanding health care providers. Author Gerald 
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Stone (2008) has another interesting possibility: The fault lies not with the counsellors, 
who may well be genuinely tolerant and accepting. It may simply be that the university or 
college has overestimated the effectiveness of counseling and offered a limited range of 
options for students who may be suffering. The stigma lies with the administrators and 
program coordinators, who may believe mental health can be solved by counseling alone 
(or that more serious problems should not be treated on-campus but I will speak more to 
this view shortly). If the problem goes beyond the scope of stress reduction or priority 
management, there may be little the facility is willing (or equipped) to do. Stone argues: 
The counseling centre as 'holding tank' raises the specter of magical thinking 
about the potency of counseling such as found in the old refrain of faculty and 
administrators: “We are dealing with the problem; the misfits are in counseling.” 
Such magical expectations tend to reinforce the notion of a heroic squadron of 
counseling centre practitioners whose mission is to develop a therapeutic campus, 
curing all the ills of the student body. These  expectations ignore the possible 
negative effect of therapy (see Smith & Glass, 1977). That  is, some clients do not 
benefit from counseling and a few get worse. (p. 496) 
One could argue, of course, that the purpose of an on-site counseling centre is to assist 
mentally unwell students in acclimatizing to campus life, ensure they are capable of 
completing their studies and refer them to outside resources if necessary—not to serve as 
a prevention or treatment facility. Leaving aside the legal issues this argument raises (in 
particular, concerning the institution’s responsibility for the reasonable welfare of its 
students), this doesn't excuse an out-of-sight, out-of-mind mentality, nor does it excuse a 
passing of the blame when tragedy inevitably strikes. If the counseling centre is not 
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responsible for reasonable preventative measures, is the administration? The policy 
makers? Is anyone responsible? While the burden shouldn't lie solely on the counseling 
services (who are, as I've argued, underequipped to deal with serious mental health 
issues), it would be complacency to think that it simply isn't the university's problem.   
 It is important not to misunderstand—raising awareness, reducing stress and 
creating a strong counseling service on-campus are all noble and important goals and 
they are excellent first steps in creating a safer higher education environment. However, 
they are not as important as creating quality mental health policies and they are certainly 
not to be marketed as the solution to the problems. When a postsecondary institution 
accepts that it has a duty to reasonable care but allows the counseling centre to shoulder 
that burden alone, one should not expect to see results. Worse, weak or problematic 
policies can open the door for particularly damaging practices. Stone (2008) discusses 
one of the most unfortunate of these practices: when counseling becomes a substitute for 
discipline. He notes that some overzealous or misguided policies will give power to the 
counseling centres that may infringe on the freedoms of students (2008). While shocking, 
this certainly isn't uncommon. In 2012, Princeton University banned a student from 
attending classes immediately after his attempted suicide (Baker, 2014). The university 
forced the student to turn over his private medical records before even considering an 
appeal, punishing his illness and violating his privacy in one act.  Many schools get away 
with such behaviour by creating policy that categorizes self-harm or even suicidal 
ideation as a behavioural issue, not a mental health issue, generally through their student 
codes of conduct (Baker, 2014). On these grounds, the university can take disciplinary 
action against students they feel may be a liability. But when policy can't be used to 
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directly expel students, it can be used to pressure them to withdraw on their own. 
Antisuicide contracts are one such mechanism through which discriminatory policy can 
be enacted. These contracts are given to students perceived as at-risk and while more 
prevalent in universities in the United States, Canada has implemented them as well 
(including such universities as Ryerson and Brock). Typically, they are used in off-
campus medical practice but have been adapted to on-campus services, where they are 
adjusted to fit the policy of the organization. Despite the term of contract, these are not 
legal documents and yet they carry with them a tremendous power if they are not adhered 
to. Failure to sign the contract indicates to the university an unwillingness to seek help 
and the university gains the power to remove the student from campus. Signing the 
contract may be no better, as some require the forfeiture of medical records and others 
force the student into a counseling schedule that (as previously discussed) may not even 
be helping them (Baker 2014).  Antisuicide contracts are even stricter when one is both a 
student and an employee of the university—failure to adhere to the terms may result in 
termination of employment, among other punishments. This is to say nothing of the fact 
that signing the contract (or even refusing to sign!) is all but admitting you have an illness 
that the university believes you to have—and counseling centres are as prone to mistakes 
as anyone. In fact, given their overworked schedule and underfunded resources, they 
perhaps are more likely to err than their off-campus counterparts. At Sarah Lawrence 
College in 2013, the counseling centre became convinced that a patient, a student 
suffering from mild schizophrenia, was an unpredictable danger due to a story containing 
“edgy dark humor” (Baker, 2014, para. 34) he had written for one of his classes. Though 
the student had his illness under control for years and was now a top student with an 
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active social life, the university was not convinced and would not allow him to remain 
on-campus. After an appeal, he was presented with an option to sign a contract: either 
agree to the schedule of on-campus counseling (an absurd seven days a week), or be kept 
from returning to the school. Even after outside medical sources sided with the student 
and agreed that he was no threat (and indeed, that he was high functioning), he was 
barred from returning to his studies. It is clear that legal liability trumped compassion. 
But moreover, these contracts encourage some very regrettable thinking. For the friends 
and family of the signer, who perhaps do not grasp the nature of mental illness, they are 
falsely reassured: my loved one can't commit suicide now that they've promised not to. 
This reassurance may even extend to the university itself, as they may assume a 
successful signing means the problem is no longer at a crisis. In reality, the pressure is 
now on the signer to prevent the symptoms of their own illness, or else they feel guilty 
for violating the contract (which also includes a clause forbidding self-harm). This is a 
pressure that those suffering from mental illness may not be equipped to bear. For that 
matter, it represents a poor understanding of suicidal ideation. For some patients, suicidal 
ideation is not a question of rational thought (i.e., It is wrong for me to kill myself 
because I know X and Y to be true) but one of impulsive or psychotically driven 
behaviour, with little regard to choice. For patients with dissociative disorders, 
schizophrenia, drug problems and a number of other issues linked to suicide, the very 
idea that their behaviour can be willed away by wanting it badly enough is patronizing. 
Can a university psychiatrist be expected—or indeed, does he or she have the time—to 
find out what drives that suicidal behaviour? What if the student hasn't had a previous 
diagnosis? Keep in mind the wait list for counseling centres on-campus in Canada can be 
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more than four months (Wynaden et al., 2014). If all the psychiatrist has to go on is the 
student's claim, a contract is a cheap and tempting solution to the overworked 
professional, if a little cold and bureaucratic. Unfortunately, the supposed solution 
benefits no one. Indeed, antisuicide contracts are very rarely effective: in fact, a study of 
inpatients found that signing the document actually significantly increased the chances 
that a patient would commit suicide (Kroll, 2007). Jerome Kroll (2007) hypothesized that 
this finding may have been a result of increased pressures placed on the patient to uphold 
the conditions of the contract. When mentally ill individuals manifest symptoms of their 
disorder, they may feel this is a failure on their part, as it is a breach of contract. Inspiring 
feelings of failure is hardly conducive to the treatment of a depressed or suicidal 
individual. Patients may feel as if the contract puts sole responsibility for their success in 
their hands and this may simply be an unreasonable expectation on the part of the 
contract provider. Kroll also notes that the contract can easily be used as a crutch in place 
of proper risk assessment and the collaborative development of a prevention plan, further 
cheapening the care of the student. He claims that there is no evidence that antisuicide 
contracts are beneficial in the slightest and that recent psychiatric literature has argued 
against their use. But when tragedy strikes on-campus, postsecondary institutes can 
breathe something of a sigh of relief with the document in hand—after all, they had 
extracted a promise from the student and so the onus was on the victim to notify 
emergency services before attempting the act. 
 Other misuses of policy have included16-month mandatory withdrawal periods 
for students suspected of being a risk to themselves (Pavela, 2006) and a case where a 
victim of rape at Amherst University who was falsely assumed to be suicidal was forced 
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into a local psychiatric ward (Baker, 2014). Similar cases have occurred at such high 
profile universities such as Harvard and Brown (Baker 2014). Surely such callous policy 
must have legal ramifications for the institutions that implement them? Forcing students 
to accept care or forcing them to withdraw from the institution are very much against the 
law—antidiscriminatory laws in both the United States and Canada cover both of those 
cases clearly. And yet, it isn't so simple. I have noted previously that administrators can 
disguise involuntary withdrawal and enforced counseling schedules as disciplinary 
action, absolving them of wrongdoing. Some universities would argue that they don't 
have a duty of care at all (though this is not something that would necessarily appear in 
public policies). Indeed, since the 2002 legal battle of the Shin family versus MIT, many 
universities have used the rulings to their advantage to craft policy that absolves the 
institution of the most blame in the event of a tragedy. MIT's lawyers argued that the 
university's untrained staff had no responsibility to keep a suffering student safe—that 
duty fell to the counseling centre (Dyer, 2008). This has led to policies that encourage 
distancing the counseling centres from the rest of the university. Ultimately, the debate 
during the trial (and in the literature following) had become a question of in loco parentis. 
In loco parentis is the expectation of an organization (in this case, a university) to step in 
as a parental figure in the absence of an individual’s actual guardians. Note that a student 
does not have to explicitly be a minor for in loco parentis to apply—if a duty of care 
exists, it extends to all students. In loco parentis has been a strange subject surrounding 
postsecondary institutions. For decades, in loco parentis did not apply to universities. 
Postsecondary institutions were to have no say, legally, in the private lives of their 
students. However, when alcohol abuse became a serious concern for a number of major 
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universities, in loco parentis was re-examined and exceptions were made. Now, some 
institutions (primarily in the United States but Canada has followed suit) can impose 
disciplinary action against students engaging in dangerous drinking behaviour off campus 
grounds (in dorms in particular). MIT argued that unlike cases of alcohol abuse, in loco 
parentis did not apply to instances of self-harm and mental illness. Students are adults 
and postsecondary institutions are not treatment facilities. If students needed treatment, 
the university argued, they could seek it in off-campus locations that were better 
equipped to handle their needs. The courts did not fully agree and ruled that while in loco 
parentis would be examined on a case-by-case basis, the university had a duty to provide 
reasonable care to students in need, though what constituted reasonable care was vague at 
best (Dyer, 2008).  
While this was certainly a step forward in ensuring someone took responsibility 
for quality health care on-campuses, it created strange legal ramifications. Essentially, for 
a postsecondary institution to now be accused of negligence in the care of the mentally 
ill, it must be determined that the ill student had a “special relationship” (p.1389) with 
some branch of health care at the facility and that service was in some way inadequate to 
meet the student's needs. Ordinarily, if the student were attending regular counseling, this 
would constitute such a relationship. Since some institutions pressure the most seriously 
ill students to withdraw instead of allowing them to seek help, it becomes much harder to 
argue, legally, that the duty of care exists. Students with minimal contact with the system 
are fine but serious cases become liabilities. Further, in the Shin case, it is interesting to 
note that while the counseling centre was found to be responsible for the student's care, 
they were not expected to disclose the illness to the student's parents. This sets a strange 
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precedent—campuses are certainly not treatment facilities (and are clearly able to get 
away with a lower standard of care while still avoiding legal action), yet are expected to 
maintain the same kind of confidentiality as their off-site counterparts. Does this 
confidentiality extend to the entire university staff, or merely the counseling services? It 
is something of a grey area. It is also an interesting juxtaposition—in loco parentis is 
partially invoked to ensure the quality care of students and yet the actual parents of those 
students are left out of the process. Students are left in a strange middle ground where 
they are too old to get family involved in their well-being, yet still have so little 
autonomy as to be forced into mental health decisions for their own good by the 
university. 
 I have talked at length on the state of policy as it concerns the on-site counseling 
centres and how they can be set up to remove students that could be a legal liability. 
Strong (and ethical) policy shouldn't isolate the issue to concern merely the mental health 
practitioners and the mentally ill. Mental health is a problem of the entire university and 
policy should reflect this. But does it? Educators recognize the problem extends to the 
classroom environment—in a 2014 study, a significant number of university professors 
(approximately 85% of those surveyed) reported that they have assisted others with 
mental health issues in their workplace and 40% of those professors reported that they 
have even assisted colleagues with mental health problems (Margrove, Gustowska, & 
Grove, 2014). And yet, despite it being a part of their workplace and classroom 
environment and despite having to advise and refer students, few received training in 
mental health: “The vast majority of respondents (71.4%) reported never having attended 
any form of training around mental health issues in their workplace” (p. 95). Of those that 
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did receive training, most did so quite recently (indicative of the changing face of mental 
health in higher education), having done so within five years of participating in the study. 
And that training is necessary—recognizing mental health problems without training is 
not as easy as one may think. The majority of the educators polled by the authors had 
trouble distinguishing ordinary symptoms of stress from more serious mental disorders 
when presented with case studies and had particular difficulty recognizing mood 
disorders other than major depression (Margrove, Gustowska, & Grove, 2014). More 
telling, perhaps, were the educators' opinions following the study. Most agreed that some 
sort of training program would be necessary and that it would assist in the daily 
functioning of their work, as current attempts to provide assistance were proving 
challenging. Caution was advised, however, in that those organizing the training must be 
“suitably trained” (p. 98)—as if some of the educators were unconvinced of the quality of 
training that current on-site services could provide them. And while the counseling 
service may be staffed with well-intentioned and well trained individuals (it is important 
to fault the policy, not the people, for the ethical failings previously discussed), this raises 
an interesting question: What is the current relationship between mental health services 
and the rest of the campus? As I alluded to previously, mental health services are often 
isolated from the rest of campus for legal reasons and can even be outsourced to private 
counseling services to further distance the centre (though a private service often has more 
resources to expend than a university is willing to invest in mental health). Victor 
Schwartz (2013), a veteran of the on-campus mental health industry echoes these feelings 
of isolation. While Schwartz insists that on-campus mental health service workers are 
well trained and compassionate, he noted that his colleagues within the university—
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professors and staff—considered his efforts less valuable than what one would find from 
counterparts off-campus. He notes “I always felt a bit of an outsider or interloper on 
college campuses” (p. 97). And as for the administration, Schwartz states,  
I have often thought that the attitude of many university administrators to 
counseling services is akin to the way many of us think of our dentists; we are 
happy they are around when there is a problem but we prefer not to think about 
them any more than absolutely necessary. (p. 96) 
He argues that while mental health professionals have been trying to work around poor 
funding and weak policy for years, they are still stuck with the blame when tragedy 
invariably strikes. Considering he wrote about these concerns less than two years ago, 
recent trends in mental health awareness may not actually be aiding the system in the way 
some hope it would. 
 What we can at least conclude from all this is that postsecondary mental health 
policy is more legalistic than humanistic. And this is perhaps understandable given tight 
budgets and an only recently lifting taboo surrounding the entire issue. That does not 
mean discriminatory policy is excusable. Looking at the areas where policy has failed, I 
believe it is possible to salvage something of a workable model policy for sustainable 
mental health services. Foremost, what the university needs is a policy that encourages 
the integration of counseling centre and the rest of the university staff. Training should be 
available to make as much of the staff aware of mental health problems, how to recognize 
them and how to refer students—the literature seems to indicate professors would take 
such training if offered. Counsellors should not be considered the end of the line for care, 
nor should they be responsible for the needs of a severely ill student but should instead 
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serve as referrals for off-campus care and treatment centres for minor health problems. 
As long as students are receiving some kind of accommodation on-campus and the 
university is assisting in providing the student off campus care, there is to be no witch 
hunt or inquisition and no need to punish students for their bravery in seeking help. 
Students are indeed, as MIT argued, adults and if these reasonable steps are taken to 
ensure their safety, they should be free to take those opportunities. This is, of course, with 
the understanding that students are often receiving health insurance only from the 
institution itself and that there are thus limitations on where and how they can seek help if 
not from the school. Finally, it should be expected that tragedy will still happen, no 
matter how good one's policy may be. Believing that one can prevent suicide on-campus 
shows a poor understanding of mental illness and is an entirely unrealistic expectation. 
The bottom line is that policy should exist to create an environment that genuinely cares 
about students. It should not be used as an excuse to turn them away. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Policy and Theory 
 To help explain why mental health reform is only now taking hold, where it is 
taking hold and why many efforts appear to be half-hearted, I’d like to turn to a 
theoretical perspective that can give some insight into the concerns of policy makers. 
After reviewing the policy documents and noting the case studies in which more 
appropriate policy was clearly needed, I am left with a number of questions I believe 
theory can answer. In particular, are the recent missteps in mental health policy (as 
outlined in the literature review) intentional marginalization of the mentally ill, or a series 
of benevolent but utilitarian decisions? Are policy makers more concerned with student 
safety, or the overall integrity (or even image) of the university? Despite the legal 
liability, are the two concepts—that is, quality mental health service and legal 
culpability—mutually exclusive in the eyes of policy makers? In this chapter, I will use 
the work of theorists Michael Apple (2001) and Michael Power (1994) to answer these 
questions. Central to the arguments of both these authors (and indeed, an important part 
of my own argument) is the idea of the bureaucratization of higher education. Power and 
Apple both agree this bureaucratization and, indeed, commercialization is a result of a 
modern trend towards neoliberalism and capitalist values. Of course, the idea that neo-
liberal ideas are at work in higher education is not unique to these theorists. Another 
theorist whose work I considered focusing on in this chapter was Henry Giroux. Giroux’s 
work dealt with neoliberalism and market forces as well. In particular, I enjoyed Giroux’s 
talk (2014) for the TAFT Research centre, “Neoliberalism, Youth and Social Justice.” He 
gave a notable call to action, which in the same breath denounced what Giroux sees as a 
war on youth: “No society can make a claim to being a democracy as long as it defines 
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itself through shared hatred and fears, rather than shared responsibilities” (Giroux, 2014). 
The hate and fear he references here are close-minded conservative leanings and the 
democratic integrity he wishes to uphold is the kind of democracy Giroux feels belongs 
in higher education and government alike. Giroux’s powerful argument helps to confirm 
the idea that youth are often at a significant disadvantage from bureaucratic policies and 
practices, which is a useful pointer to keep in mind when reading legalistic modern policy 
documents. Where policy has created an oppositional relationship between students and 
administrators, Giroux’s idea of a democracy in peril may be helpful in framing the 
problem. 
Indeed, though criticism of modern neo-liberal thought is not hard to come by, the 
arguments of Power (1994) and Apple (2001) together form a more cohesive picture of 
the problem I am trying to address. I feel that Power’s concept of the audit explosion 
helps explain why higher education chooses to adopt policy that is legalistic in nature. 
Meanwhile Apple’s concern with neo-liberal influence pushing organizations towards a 
safe, moderate middle ground may explain why universities are reluctant to draft policy 
at all. 
The Audit Explosion 
 
Michael Power’s (2001) The Audit Explosion makes clear that audits are a self-
sustaining tool for creating and maintaining a structure of control. They represent a kind 
of neo-liberal bureaucratization of an organization and Power finds them a poor solution 
to a problem that no one needed them to solve. Audits, he argues, are systems of control 
that act without having to be present, such as through the fear of being tested or through 
surprise inspections. In this way, they are a means to decentralize control, to distance 
36 
 
 
 
oneself from a given organizational problem. They are solutions delivered from afar, with 
limited internal trust. Solutions involve obtaining private experts and outside sources to 
inform decisions, with internal actors often left in the dark as to developments in policy 
or protocol until they are already implemented. Power notes that the audit is a particularly 
stubborn concept and that even when the system explicitly causes inconvenience or 
outright fails to solve the problem it is purporting to solve, the audit culture remains 
intact. This pervasiveness is difficult to explain, as I discuss in the next section of this 
chapter. 
To return to the concept of audits themselves, it is hard to miss the potential 
benefit for certain powerful individuals given a system that practically regulates itself and 
that is highly susceptible to influence from outside forces. This hands-off approach to 
policy control is particularly appealing to administration seeking to avoid legal 
consequences from a student population that it doesn’t fully trust. The audit culture 
encourages a distancing approach and rather than foster trust and open dialogue, it would 
sooner see a system of policy makers create a standardized solution. The system of 
thought under an audit culture is one of mistrust and in the case of higher education, 
students take the place of the workers on the lowest rung of trust. In a system where 
professionals review professionals and the authority of others is influenced by layered 
systems of control, is the student left with any authority by which he or she may be 
trusted? This is reminiscent of what we are seeing in modern mental health policy. Many 
of the policy documents (I must look once again towards Carleton and Queen’s) make 
claims towards creating an open discussion but despite this, the goals and scope of their 
proposed programs have already been decided. 
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Neoliberalism and Higher Education 
 
While Power's work is strong, several questions remain unaddressed in relation to 
higher education and auditing. For instance, who is responsible for ensuring these audits 
maintain their power? As Power notes, the audit loses potency without fear of (or respect 
for) the audit within the system being influenced and suggests systemic neo-liberal 
ideology as an explanation as to why there is continued compliance and why the audit 
seems resistant to critique from within. There is little doubt he is correct but perhaps the 
full answer is still more complex. Michael Apple (2001), in his article “Educational and 
Curricular Restructuring and the Neo-liberal and Neo-conservative Agendas,” argues that 
there are three or four main ideological groups who promote the modern advancement of 
policy in institutions like higher education. These groups have reason to utilize and trust a 
system like the audit, both from outside an organization and from within. He notes that 
all four groups, through various motivations, move policy towards a more politically 
conservative standpoint. They represent a movement, a wave of modernization that seeks 
to find a new purpose for education and new goals for its policies. While Apple 
acknowledges that most of his experience lies with institutes in the United States, he has 
noticed these trends certainly exist beyond those borders, particularly in Canada and the 
United Kingdom. For my purposes, I will focus on three of Apple’s four primary groups 
of actors. The fourth group, which Apple identifies as fundamentalist Christians, 
traditionally have strong opinions on mental illness and suicide but I believe there is too 
much overlap with the neo-conservative group to warrant discussion. The motivations of 
both groups are largely the same, except one stems from politics and the other stems from 
religion. It is also important to note that the universities in this review are secular, and so 
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religion is not (at least in theory) a motivating factor for these policy-makers. 
A familiar group from Power’s text, the neo-liberals are among the chief groups 
Apple claims are responsible for policy reform and unsurprisingly their ideal reform 
strategy (according to Apple) is centered around economic objectives. They would like to 
see schools becoming more competitive with one another (not unlike corporate systems) 
and would like curriculum to train students for real world work experience. Policy 
introduced by this group would set schools up in a market-like structure, with students 
treated as consumers of education, much as Power noted. In the context of our discussion 
on mental health, then, does funding for mental health services fit a neo-liberal agenda? It 
seems unlikely, as quite a number of universities (such as Carleton and Brock) have cited 
the high costs of mental health service reform, a cost that is likely difficult to subsidize. If 
entire academic departments can be endangered for failing to turn a profit, what can be 
said for comparatively expensive psychiatric care, the function of which is arguably 
secondary to the school’s primary academic goals? Humanistic policy makes little sense 
from an economic standpoint. 
Apple goes on, however, to cite another player in higher education policy (and 
policy ideas in general): neo-conservatives. While they are as economically minded as 
their neo-liberal bedfellows, they arrive at this goal through a different path altogether. 
Apple describes their motivation thus: “their main agenda is cultural ‘restoration.’…They 
wish a return to teacher dominated, high status knowledge, largely based on the traditions 
that have historically been seen as the most legitimate knowledge at elite universities” 
(Apple, 2001, p. 175). This push towards conservative thought obviously opposes reform 
strategies that deviate from what they perceive are traditional values. For this group, 
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policy extraneous to creating a high value product out of education is likely unnecessary.  
This is to say nothing of the fact that for this group, the marginalized (and among them, 
the mentally ill) are an “other” that do not mesh with their traditional view of a 
homogenized, standardized classroom. Outlier groups are a bane to standardization and 
are unlikely to fare well in policy changes spearheaded by neo-conservatives. 
The last group of policy collaborators I will mention are what Apple refers to as 
“members of the professional and managerial new middle class” or “experts for hire” (p. 
iii). While Apple speaks only briefly on their motivations (noting, indeed, that they would 
not necessarily self-identify with a particular ideology), they are a common fixture within 
audit-driven models of control. Their interests are largely self-serving, as they have, 
through expertise, carved out niches where they may act as figures of authority to 
organizations from outside the organization itself. This is a balance they are keen to 
maintain and conservative, audit-centric stratagems help keep the power in their hands. 
All of these groups, Apple argues, share a collaborative control over the direction 
of education and policy. When policy makers (or, indeed, policy-influencers) are 
challenged by those who demand reform (as we see in the current mental health 
movement), if the outcry cannot be silenced, there is a clear threat to the leadership of 
these groups should they not comply with public demand. Apple notes that policy 
makers’ responses to these situations (in his example, the issue is multiculturalism in the 
curriculum) is a particularly manipulative one. 
Now, in order for dominant groups to maintain leadership, they must incorporate 
some limited segments of that [opposing] agenda into their own position. And 
what dominant groups did do, quite remarkably and very successfully in some 
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ways, was to take (how can I put this?) both the most moderate and safest forms--
and often the most conservative forms--of multiculturalism and put them into 
schools and curriculum. (Apple, 2001, p. v) 
This tactic seems all too familiar, as many of the policy documents collected for this 
review seem to only scratch the surface of the real problem at hand. This is to say nothing 
of the grandiose sounding announcements of reform from some universities that appear to 
have no real follow-through. This is not to say that higher education administrators are 
malevolent, on the contrary, merely that their understanding of what is best for their 
institution is often highly utilitarian rather than empathic. This utilitarianism can also be 
partially self-serving, of course, when it means that outliers can be silenced at the most 
effective cost and with minimal public backlash. 
 Apple also concerns himself with the kind of pedagogy this kind of conservative 
modernization is creating. Particularly, he mentions that it may well change the way 
democracy is talked about. It appears to Apple that democracy in higher education (and 
in other social policies) has become fragmented and compartmentalized. There are no 
communal problems in this model but rather, problems for departments and even 
individuals and problems should be referred and sorted accordingly. This kind of 
pedagogy may be influencing mental health issues in universities. Given the incredibly 
active role that student unions are playing in the development of mental health policies 
and frameworks, mental health might be thought of as a largely student problem rather 
than an institution-wide problem. More to the point, the idea that faculty are often 
encouraged to maintain a hands-off approach to dealing with mental health issues in 
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students and colleagues, serving merely as a means of referral to the proper channels 
seems to reinforce this line of thinking. 
 Power and Apple’s thoughts on neo-liberal (and associated groups) control over 
education and social policy share common ground in that both theorists understand that 
market-centric policies and audit-driven systems of administration are pushing 
educational reform in unhealthy directions. Together, these theorists note the loss of 
transparency and accountability (as policy decisions move to the more privatized 
experts), as well as a weakening of trust and democracy. That said, for the purposes of 
this paper, my arguments align primarily with Apple. His more complex theory of the 
actors involved paints a more complete picture of how this kind of incomplete or 
questionable policy could come to exist. With these concepts in mind, I wish to focus 
now on the raw data, the policy documents themselves. While I believe that neo-liberal 
values are inherent in these policies, it is also very telling should the institution have little 
to no policy surrounding mental health. After all, why would a neo-liberal system create 
policy to foster a closer connection to a group of students it would categorize as a 
liability? This is particularly jarring if physical health issues are represented in policy and 
if other kinds of policy are readily available. In Chapter Four, I will note the considerable 
number of major universities without policy at all and for those that do, I will highlight 
the legalistic nature of those policies. 
Narrative Policy Analysis 
 
Identifying neo-liberalist tendencies is, of course, not the same as performing 
policy analysis. It is an excellent theoretical framework to help explain why modern 
university policy looks the way it does but questions remain. In particular, does neo-
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liberalism necessarily make for bad policy? Of course not—possessing legalistic qualities 
may in fact make administrations run more efficiently, if a little less empathetically. 
Given what few documents that I could uncover, how could it possibly be determined 
what was effective? Unfortunately, without speaking directly to the students affected by 
the policies in question, it is difficult to say for certain (though this is certainly an area for 
future research). However, in cases of controversial or incomplete policies (especially 
when there is a lack of raw statistical data or expert consensus surrounding the issues the 
policy addresses), analysts turn to narrative policy analysis. Narrative policy analysis 
relies on examining the stories, sometimes in the form of anecdotes, on all sides of a 
policy issue. Major parties in the issue often have their own narratives that they are using 
to exemplify their argument. For example, a Republican senator may tell the story of a 
man who defended his home from intruders through the use of a gun. The senator would 
be using the narrative to further his pro-gun argument. If the story spreads and enters the 
public consciousness, it becomes harder to distinguish the argument from the narrative 
put forward to support it. It is the job of narrative policy analysts to determine what the 
stories involved in an issue are and which story, if any, has merit, or if an entirely new 
meta-narrative must be constructed to facilitate positive change in policy. In using 
narrative policy analysis, this study has relied heavily on author Emery Roe (1994), a 
practicing policy analyst. His text, Narrative Policy Analysis, is an in-depth guide to the 
use of the analytic technique. Roe’s examples draw a great deal from the economic and 
political spheres but his theories on narrative policy analysis are applicable to all kinds of 
policy. The primary methods of analysis, Roe argues, are those of literary theory. An 
analyst examines stories for their logical consistency, structure but mostly for their ability 
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to create emotional impact. This latter quality is the most important for Roe, because 
memorable stories seep into public consciousness and help to promote action on 
controversial policy issues where it would otherwise stagnate. Obviously, this is 
imperfect (and likely unpalatable for the more scientific minded who prefer quantifiable 
analysis). Yet, Roe notes that even when the best narrative that can be found is a factually 
inaccurate one, “we keep to the narrative anyway in absence of a better story and 
because, again, decisions have to be taken now. Waiting is not possible, or when we do 
wait for better information … that research all too often raises further questions and 
problems said to require urgent answers as well” (p. 8). Surely, if mental health is 
reaching a crisis and if universities find themselves lacking any mental health policy at 
all, then we require analysis that promotes decision making. 
 So how have these techniques been used in this paper to examine policy? The 
counter-administrative narrative was clear: the stories of Elizabeth Shin and others like 
her, are powerful. They tell a story of suffering youth who are denied access to quality 
care because administrators seemingly care more for protecting themselves than their 
students. Similarly, it is a story of those same administrators who saw fit to ruin the 
academic careers of students rather than risk the remote possibility of legal difficulties. 
Whether these stories held truth, of course, remained to be seen. It was also clear the kind 
of narrative administrators were trying to tell.  Theirs is a story of an overburdened and 
underfunded school system, trying to care for the needs of as many students as possible 
but facing an increasing number of students with mental health problems that they are not 
equipped to handle. Even if the students could be accommodated, the school would be 
held legally responsible if something went wrong and that would break an already 
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strained budget. Worse, the tragedy would certainly disrupt the academic lives of other 
students, to say nothing of their own mental health. Of course both narratives hold truth 
and both contain exaggeration. Only by examining both narratives could I determine the 
course that was best for university mental health policy. 
One could argue at this stage that the meta-narratives may have been 
misidentified. Indeed, it is not as though administrators have put forward a deliberately 
neo-liberal story—it is often quite the opposite, with a number of surface-level programs 
put forth to create a narrative of empathy and caring. Aside from the warning signs of 
neo-liberalism that Apple and Giroux espouse, how can one be sure the policies that were 
found are indeed neo-liberal and that a fair comparison has been made? Once again, I 
look to Roe. When an analyst looks for evidence of an existing narrative where one is not 
explicitly stated (or is in some way obfuscated due to an unpalatable nature), Roe 
suggests looking to the language being used by the party involved for clues. For example, 
in the case of the controversy surrounding animal testing, Roe notes that practitioners of 
animal testing use terms such as “sacrificed” and “harvested,” (p. 81) which imply the 
researchers view the animals more as tools or crops than living organisms. These words 
are important elements to the researchers’ narrative, even though it may not be what the 
researchers intended to portray. Following this example, this study has paid careful 
attention to the language of the policy documents that could be found. Though the policy 
documents themselves contained some examples of neo-liberal language (which I note in 
the review of each document), the most damning examples of neo-liberal language were 
found in the tools used to enforce these policies. By this I refer to the no-harm contracts 
used by residences and mental health centres in a number of Ontario Universities. The 
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language of these contracts is discussed further in Chapter Six. 
 The analysis itself came after the collection of data. The lack of policy documents 
uncovered was more damning to the case of policy makers than inept or inadequate 
documents would have been. The narrative of caring but overburdened administrators 
stuck facing a mental health crisis is harder to swallow when there are no documents in 
the works to address that crisis. If they were doing all they could to ease the burden on 
the system, they would engage in better communication with students and make any 
existing documentation easier to find. While there is undoubtedly truth to the claim that 
universities face a potential powder keg of legal issues when dealing with mentally ill 
students, their desire to excise the problem completely cannot be disguised. Their 
narrative is one without emotion, with a complex argument and is a plight that is difficult 
to empathize with. The narrative that must inform policy is the one that the students 
themselves are putting forward. It is a simple yet powerful message: give those who are 
suffering the help they need.  
To the reader of this thesis, this conclusion may feel somewhat unsatisfying. 
Shouldn’t the dominant narrative (that of the policy makers) be proven incorrect in some 
fashion? Shouldn’t it be thoroughly refuted before calling for a change in policy? I don’t 
believe so, and Roe has the explanation here: 
What displaces a policy narrative … is not a negative finding that seems to refute 
it. Refutation of a decision maker’s argument for action doesn’t mean you have 
taken away her or his perceived need to act. Rather, displacing a discredited 
narrative requires an equally straightforward narrative that tells a better story. 
(p.40)  
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What we see in cases like Elizabeth Shin and those like her is precisely that: a better 
story. They are tragic stories, for which there can be little excuse. When examining the 
policy documents in detail in the next chapter, my comments are made with the 
administrative narrative in mind. In particular, my consideration is of how the document 
contributes to or harms the overarching narrative that the university is trying to present. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLICY DOCUMENTATION 
Policy Collection Methods 
Data collection for this study was performed primarily online. I had an interest in 
which documents were publicly accessible and so began my search in publicly accessible 
channels. In my search process, I attempted to mirror the search for information by a 
student of a given university who would be curious about how his or her mental illness 
would be handled on-campus. While I found differing results for each university, the 
search process was consistent. The first search would be for any mental health and 
wellness pages, taking note of any contact information found there. Also of interest on 
these pages are privacy information, referral guidelines, tools used by the health and 
wellness centre and operating standards and procedures. I then moved the search to a 
general search for policy pages and lists. I began by using the website’s own search 
engine, then manually searched each website in places policy would commonly be found 
(e.g., the office of the Vice President and the university Secretariat in particular). Of 
interest in this search was any document containing the keywords mental health, mental 
illness, or code of conduct. Finally, one last search of the website was conducted for 
anything that may have been missed, or anything relevant that may not have appeared to 
be a policy document at first glance. A search of programs and initiatives on-campus, as 
well as of student unions and their internal policies sometimes turned up additional 
information about mental health. Of particular interest were residence guidelines, campus 
news (notably recent suicides) and references to developing documents and frameworks 
that may be hosted off-site. 
After exhausting all web-based options for finding policy, I began to contact the 
universities for further policy information using contact information gathered in my 
48 
 
 
 
search. I began by e-mailing the mental health and wellness centres, if the university 
provided the contact information. If not, I attempted to contact the next logical on-
campus student service. If a policy document was found, typically the authors of that 
document were contacted if possible. Then, if no reply was received within two weeks, I 
sent a second e-mail to another department that I felt could direct me towards mental 
health information, including mental health coordinators, policy makers and student 
group leaders (if they had been cited in the creation of policy or frameworks). Each 
university received a total of two e-mails this way. In my e-mails, I explained that I was 
seeking mental health policy, or any formal guidelines that govern mental health issues 
on-campus. I requested that if they were unable to provide policy, or if they were 
unaware of policy that existed, they refer me to another department they thought may be 
able to direct me (but I noted that absent policy was still useful information). Only three 
of the 13 universities responded to either of my two e-mails. 
When describing the documents gathered from this research, I use three key 
terms: policy document, policy framework, and policy tool. Policy documents are formal, 
written guidelines for management and problem-solving. They are not necessarily 
immutable, but are carefully worded to minimize confusion and standardize the 
behaviour of individuals in an organization. Policy frameworks exist to help develop 
policy documents. They are sets of recommendations, compilations of research, and 
structural outlines meant to aid in the construction of a finished policy document. Most of 
the documents discussed in this review are frameworks. Finally, policy tools are the 
means by which policy is enacted. Policy tools are the practice to a document’s theory. 
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Policy tools were not included in the initial research, but are discussed in chapter six as a 
means of examining emergent policy that may not otherwise have been apparent. 
All research was carried out between March and September of 2015.  Frameworks 
and policy documents presented later in the chapter are the entire accumulation of these 
efforts. No documents were uncovered but excluded from the review. 
Policy Data 
 Policy is a set of procedures that govern actions taken by an individual or 
organization. This thesis is interested primarily in formal, written, policy documents. This 
way, the language of the policy can be analyzed in a way that would not be possible with 
informal policy (informal policy consisting of practices and procedures known to staff 
but not recorded). Recorded policy is necessary for accountability and communication, 
both to staff who are working directly with the policy and to students whom the policy is 
concerning. In order to organize and manage a network of care services on-campus, a set 
of general procedures and guidelines must be in place for staff to understand what is 
expected of them. Similarly, if students are to understand how their university will 
accommodate them (or not, as the case may be), the university must be able to 
communicate their intention clearly. Further, if students suffering mental illness are to 
feel as though their issues are being addressed, representation in policy documents is an 
excellent way for the university to show these students they care about providing 
treatment for their issues specifically, not merely for the vague concept of mental health 
problems. 
 I would now like to turn the discussion towards the specific policy documents I 
have collected in the course of my research. In particular, I have highlighted areas of the 
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documents where the language and ideas are troubling or patronizing, suspiciously 
legalistic and protective of administrators, or merely impractical. In finding appropriate 
documents for policy analysis, I limited my search to universities with a student 
population of over 10,000. These population data were gathered from the Ontario Council 
of University Libraries, updated July 2015 (Retrieved from: 
http://www.ocul.on.ca/node/21). The universities included in this review are as follows, 
in order of size (largest student population to smallest): University of Toronto, York 
University, University of Ottawa, University of Western Ontario, University of Waterloo, 
Ryerson University, McMaster Univeristy, University of Guelph, Carleton University, 
Queen’s University, Wilfrid Laurier University, Brock University and University of 
Windsor. Although I have restricted much of my research to Ontario universities as a 
case study, I have also included a single document from a university outside the province 
for the sake of comparison.  
This policy review is concerned with whether documents are publicly available. 
By this I mean documents to which students and faculty alike should have access, 
whether through the university's website or other channels. During the research process, I 
was reminded once again of the court case surrounding Elizabeth Shin, in which 
information on MIT’s promise of care was vague at best. If these documents have the 
goal of preventing another tragic death like that of Shin and if they are truly representing 
an administration that desires openness and accountability, the documents should be easy 
to find and access. With this in mind, I paid particular attention to how the documents 
were retrieved. I initially wished to restrict the study to include only documents that were 
hosted on the university’s official website, in a section where students (and indeed, 
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faculty) could reasonably expect to find policy. However this proved nearly impossible. 
Only five of Ontario’s major universities offered a framework, a series of 
recommendations meant to inform policy—but none offered finished policy 
documentation. Very few hosted even these fledgling policies from their main website, or 
even provided a link to a document. Students and faculty would have a difficult time 
attempting to discover exactly how their institution addresses mental health problems 
through any casual search and in the case of many Ontario universities, they would have 
no luck with publicly available documents at all. This may well be because some 
campuses simply haven't drafted policy and have been using peripheral documents and 
judgment calls to deal with mental health issues for years. 
 Some of the framework documents were only available after contacting the 
university and despite efforts, some universities simply could not be reached for further 
information. For students inquisitive about policy that could affect them personally, it 
may often be best to look at existing documents that could be filling the role of mental 
health policy. This includes documents such as the student code of conduct (though not 
all Ontario universities have one) or accessibility services documentation. Unfortunately, 
universities will often be vague about procedures surrounding mental health issues on-
campus or which policies are actually used to govern mental health. This could allow the 
university to use the policy as it benefits them, citing it to deal with a potential liability, 
or ignoring it so that their hands are not tied on a sensitive issue. 
Table 1 outlines the data from all 13 universities in the review. Student 
populations were gathered from Ontario Council of University Libraries. The table allows 
one to discuss the commonalities and interesting emergent themes in the mental health 
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Table 1 
Overview of Data 
 
University 
name 
Student 
population 
Primary 
policy 
document 
Alternative 
mental 
health policy 
Primary 
document 
availability 
Authorship 
University 
of Toronto 
76,954 University of 
Toronto 
Student 
Mental Health 
Strategy and 
Framework 
(2014) 
Various; 
under review 
Online Provostial 
Advisory 
Committee 
on Student 
Mental 
Health 
York 
University 
48,809  Code of 
conduct/ 
residence 
guidelines 
(vague) 
   
University 
of Ottawa  
37,227  Code of 
conduct/ 
residence 
guidelines 
(vague) 
  
University 
of Western 
Ontario 
36,203 Western 
Mental Health 
Assessment  
Code of 
conduct/ 
residence 
guidelines 
(vague) 
Available 
after being 
requested 
Assorted 
student 
service 
providers 
(campus 
recreation, 
chaplaincy, 
etc) 
University 
of 
Waterloo 
33,555  Unclear   
Ryerson 
University 
30,665 Ryerson 
Mental Health 
Advisory 
Committee—
Appendix 
Student Code 
of Conduct 
Available 
after being 
requested 
Ryerson 
Mental 
Health 
Advisory 
Committee 
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(2013)  
McMaster 
University 
30,117  COPE, 
Student Code 
of Conduct, 
Connections 
IV Orange 
Reference 
Folder 
  
University 
of Guelph 
25,948  Code of 
conduct/ 
residence 
guidelines 
(vague) 
  
Carleton 
University 
24,161 Student 
Mental Health 
Framework 
(2009) 
Student Code 
of Conduct 
Online Unclear 
(presented 
by the office 
of the 
Associate 
Vice 
President of 
Students and 
Enrollment) 
Queen’s 
University 
23,049 Student 
Mental Health 
Framework 
(2012) 
Code of 
conduct/ 
residence 
guidelines 
(vague) 
Online Principal's 
Commission 
on Mental 
Health 
Wilfrid 
Laurier 
University 
17,246  Unclear   
Brock 
University 
16,574  Student Code 
of Conduct 
  
University 
of 
Windsor 
15,083  Unclear   
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policy development strategies of each of these major universities. Of note is the 
apparent fact that university size does not seem to have an effect on the rate at 
which policy is being developed or the availability of a public framework. This is 
curious, as one would have suspected larger institutions with greater resources 
(and a potentially larger in-need student population) would be more likely to have 
produced a comprehensive framework. While it is clear that the University of 
Toronto has constructed a higher quality (or at least more in-depth) framework 
than many of its peers, there does not appear to be any pattern among other 
institutions.  As all the documents are works in progress, it is understandable that 
the frameworks are not always available through intuitive channels. 
The column detailing the availability of the primary policy documents helps to 
illustrate how difficult it would be for the average student to find information on mental 
health policy. The authorship of these documents is also comparable. All the frameworks 
have been created by some sort of mental health review team, the composition of which 
varies. Most commonly, teams are staffed by administrative positions like residence life 
managers, directors of university safety and deans. In the case of the University of 
Toronto, there is also some involvement from the student union. Actual mental health 
service representatives are often only a fraction of the authorship team. Clearly these men 
and women have an important advisory role but often community members and campus 
security have as much representation, which may well equate to a more limited voice for 
on-campus mental health in informing policy decisions. The alterative mental health 
policy documents column refers to university policies that may not directly relate to 
mental health but currently support or fully handle decisions related to mental health 
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issues. These typically include student codes of conduct, disability services policy and 
residence life agreements. Clearly, those universities without active mental health 
policies are relying on some preexisting policies to handle mental health issues on-
campus. Unfortunately, it is often unclear exactly what universities are relying on to 
handle these issues, as their policies are sometimes vague or informal. I have included 
policies here that appear to have ties to mental health or have been amended to include 
allowances for mental health issues. 
University of Toronto 
 Like many of the other frameworks in this review, the University of Toronto 
Student Mental Health Strategy and Framework (2014) could not be found by navigating 
the University of Toronto website. While it appears to be hosted from the Office of the 
Vice-President’s page, it cannot be found among any of the available links, even on the 
page collecting policies and frameworks. The page could be easily found, however, using 
search engines not bound to the university’s website. It appears to also be hosted from its 
own dedicated webpage, where the important points of the framework are summarized. 
 Though I will raise questions on the language and concepts other policies seem to 
be employing, this framework seems to be surprisingly less troubling than others in its 
wording. Particularly impressive is the recognition that mental health is a continuum and 
that programs to address one range of problems may not be suitable for the entire 
spectrum.  It also is one of the few frameworks to make the distinction between mental 
health (an overall state of well-being and contentment with life) and mental illness 
(medical conditions of varying severity that impair cognitive function in some way), a 
distinction that is crucial to the discussion. A student with suicidal ideation may have 
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poor mental health, or he or she may suffer from a mental illness, or some combination of 
the two. It is, after all, possible for a person with a mental illness to have good mental 
health—to be content and happy, despite coping with a disability. In making these 
distinctions, the goal of creating accessible mental health services for the seriously ill and 
the goal of building coping skills and “resilience” among students can be put into 
perspective. It is one of the few frameworks that does not discuss the prohibitive cost of 
upgrading mental health services, thereby allowing it to entertain the idea that accessible 
mental health can be a reality. From there, the document thoroughly outlines potential 
policy changes that can have a positive impact on the mental health system, including 
voluntary medical leave (and subsequent ease of re-entry) and promotion of inclusive 
curriculum. Further, it points to specific, existing policy within the university that can be 
interpreted (and amended) to help suffering students. It is one of the most comprehensive 
documents on mental health policy in higher education available. 
 The framework places great importance on language and pedagogy—the framing 
of the discussion can be as important as its content. This is evident in a graphical 
framework model the university adapted from a similar model by Cornell University 
(Cornell University, 2012). The graphic displays the framework's core ideas and in 
adapting Cornell's model, the University of Toronto kept many of the principles Cornell 
identified but framed them in softer or more appropriate language. Cornell's "increasing 
help-seeking behaviour" becomes "promoting help-seeking behaviour," a subtle change 
that seems more humanistic—we do not need to increase help-seeking behaviour to meet 
an expectation or quota, we promote it in the hopes that it empowers students. "Restrict 
access to suicide methods" (a reactive, symptom-treating approach, surely) becomes 
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"policies through an equity and diversity lens"—a commitment to changing and evolving 
policy that the Cornell model lacks. "Identify people in need of care" becomes the more 
specific "campus-wide mental health literacy,” the means by which those in need of care 
can be identified by faculty or through which students can be informed and empowered to 
come forward themselves. Clear language and pedagogy at the classroom level continues 
to be a theme in the document, as the framework devotes a section to the topic.  
When addressing policy reform, the university first detailed its existing policies 
that handle mental health: 
The University currently has policies and statements which support student 
mental health and safe and healthy learning environments: Policy on Academic 
Appeals within Divisions (December 12, 2005); Code of Student Conduct 
(February 14, 2002); Statement of Commitment Regarding Persons with 
Disabilities (November 1, 2004); General Principles Regarding Discipline in 
University Residences (April 18, 1985); Policy with Respect to Workplace 
Violence (May 13, 2010); Statement on Equity, Diversity and Excellence 
(December 14, 2006); Statement on Human Rights (July 12, 2012); and the 
Statement of Institutional Purpose (October 15, 1992). (p. 23) 
Of course, of these listed policies, none make explicit mention of mental health—
unsurprisingly, as they are mere stand-in for more appropriate procedure, a fact the 
university acknowledges. It is interesting that the university's student code of conduct is 
included among the documents governing mental health issues. This disciplinary 
framework could potentially be cited to take action against students with suicidal 
ideation—codes like these have been cited to justify involuntary leave for suicidal 
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students at other institutions (Baker, 2014). However, after perusing the policy, one notes 
that the university is careful to define the offense of violence as an act against another 
person, unlike the codes of conduct at Ryerson and Carleton, which use language to 
suggest that self-harming behaviour could be met with punishment. Even the University 
of Toronto's residence discipline policy, which one would suspect to be outdated (given it 
hasn't been updated since 1985), remains sensible in its wording in comparison to other 
Ontario institutions. The policy calls for informal procedure wherever possible, where 
often the opposite is the first instinct of other universities (of particular note is the 
multiple stage review process carried out by Brock). While one cannot be sure an 
informal approach is necessarily effective (the document neglects to mention exactly 
what is meant by an informal approach), handling cases informally may encourage 
students to seek help, or at least helps to prevent them from feeling the process is 
uncaring and legalistic. Further, it may discourage contracting behaviour on the part of 
residence administration, a common practice with a variety of issues discussed later in the 
paper. 
Sadly, this is merely a framework and while the document recommends that 
policy should be developed, there is no evidence from the University of Toronto that any 
such policy is currently in place. The policies the document calls attention to are well 
worded but have not been designed necessarily with mental health issues in mind and are 
perhaps ill-suited to handle the complexities inherent in mental health procedures. 
However, at the time of writing this thesis, the framework has been released for less than 
a year and one can remain hopeful that developments are in the works. The university 
notes that it has policy concerning the accommodation of mentally ill students but was 
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vague as to what that level of accommodation may entail. Accessibility services seem 
aware of the gap, however and expects that policy reform will come in the fall of 2015.  
A final but minor note: student residence at the University of Toronto has no 
centralized governing office and each residence don is free to implement or adapt policy 
as they see fit for their residence building. The framework discussed here makes no 
mention of whether it is something that residence dons have to answer to, or if they have 
their own set of regulations. However, after contacting some of the residences, I was 
informed that they were indeed unfamiliar with the framework and that mental health 
issues in residence were handled on a case by case basis. 
York University 
York University has seemingly abundant services available for students, though 
the exact nature of these services remains vague, given the information on their mental 
health services page. What is particularly striking is that York takes pains to note that 
mentally ill students can be supported through the university’s disabilities program—a 
service many universities imply but few actually claim outright. However, like most other 
universities on this list, York has little, if any, policy documentation available. Without 
policy, it is hard to know if these services are acting adequately to help students in need, 
or if faculty members are competently referring students to these services. Given that in 
2013, York announced it “seeks to move from the more traditional response of providing 
care after a mental health crisis” (Rider, 2013, para. 1) to a more proactive approach 
(which it hoped to develop over the next year), it would appear that the decision to 
develop working policy has been made quite recently indeed. One imagines that such 
policy is still in the works, though no framework has emerged at the time of writing. 
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 It is unclear what policies York is relying on in lieu of proper mental health 
policy. Likely, disability services and their accommodation policies pick up some of the 
slack but without outlining the procedures involved, it is unclear whether accommodation 
is sufficient—and it is surely not enough to handle all the mental health policy needs of 
the university. The university’s student code of conduct does mention involuntary leave 
periods like those discussed in the literature review but this is only for a ten-day period 
by default and is limited to 60 days in cases where no criminal charges are involved. 
Indeed, it is unclear whether the student code of conduct is intended to be used with 
mental health issues at York that are not actively destructive or harmful to peers. There is 
no explicit mention of self-harm or mental illness. 
 Given York’s claims to support mentally ill students through disability 
accommodations (and this accommodation is likely their primary mental health policy 
source), I wanted to learn more—in particular, if there were any policies governing this 
practice, or if there were interactions with university privacy policies and how the 
average student could find this information. While information gathering would be 
difficult or perhaps unintuitive for students via online channels, the university is not 
without relevant contacts. York mental health wellness committee, for instance, works 
closely with mental health services (and shares some of the same staff) and have been 
responsible for the organization of mental health programs and awareness campaigns at 
the university. Mental health services itself is without contact information but the 
wellness committee is available for contact, as is accessibility services. 
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University of Ottawa 
 The University of Ottawa appears to have limited mental health services. Their 
website outlines the functions of the Counseling and Coaching service, which appears to 
be the primary mental health resource on-campus. Health Services evidently has on staff 
psychiatrists (and an on-staff mental health research team) but students must first register 
with health services, see a doctor, then be referred to mental health services—only a 
referral from a university Family Health Team member can get someone an 
appointment. Students can book appointments only from the Counseling and Coaching 
service—there is no contact information available for Health Services on the website. 
From the Counseling and Coaching service’s own FAQ, they note that counseling exists 
primarily for “temporary life difficulties,” and coaching services are for those students 
with normal mental health functioning but who wish to achieve optimal academic 
success. Professionals on staff are psychologists with graduate degrees, not psychiatrists 
or psychologists with terminal degrees. Emergencies, they note on their main mental 
health page, are dealt with hopefully on a same-day basis (but if not, they can be referred 
to an off-campus emergency service). Further, the FAQ ensures that sessions are 
confidential but the link to access more information about the extent of this 
confidentiality simply doesn’t exist (as is the policy form for granting students academic 
accommodations for their difficulties, which simply reads “PDF missing” at the time of 
writing). More critically, another missing document is the How to Refer PDF, which 
would supposedly outline what to do when faced with a crisis situation (though the 
university seems to recommend first talking to the person with compassion and caring 
before bothering to refer an individual in crisis).  
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Beyond the service provided, however, the website provides a genuinely helpful 
and in-depth guide to identifying and referring mentally unwell students under its faculty 
and parents section. Of course, it may not be clear to students to look here for information 
or how to use this information to assist their peers. While this all may be adequate 
(arguably) for general mental health concerns, those with mental illness would have to 
rely solely on support from health services. This is unfortunate, because from the vague 
coverage provided online, mental health is a peripheral function for campus health 
services. Indeed, if mentally unwell individuals must waste time moving through the 
system and talking to people untrained in their form of illness to get to the professionals 
they actually need to see, there is a serious problem. 
 The mental health service could not provide policy documentation, nor could any 
other portion of the website. For that matter, no peripheral policy seemed to pick up the 
slack for the lack of mental health policy documents—even the oft relied on student code 
of conduct is absent at the university. The institution has attempted to implement a code 
of conduct several times over the last decade but have not been successful. 
University of Western Ontario 
 The University of Western Ontario devotes a significant portion of their web page 
to mental health, even going so far as to have guidelines for referring potentially ill 
students for counseling. Though often vague, this is a step up for students seeking 
information, to say nothing of confused faculty unsure of how to deal with these issues in 
their classrooms. However, it is not policy and the University of Western Ontario does 
not provide the same level of policy detail for mental illness on-campus that it does for 
physical illnesses, at least through easily accessible means. Of note for this institution is 
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what little policy exists is, unsurprisingly, privacy information for the campus mental 
health services. The centre operates largely under “implied consent,” where the personal 
information provided by students can be disclosed to any parties the centre feels may be 
relevant to the patient’s care (including outside facilities, professors, family, etc) on the 
grounds that the student had not indicated otherwise and that by volunteering for help he 
or she would not object to such disclosure. Their referral guidelines (itself a separate, 
five-page document) notes that information is shared freely within the campus to 
“maintain a safe campus community.” Perhaps this might not be the case when handling 
more sensitive student information, or when dealing with a more serious psychiatric 
illness but the privacy information did not indicate what would happen in such cases. 
 Western was able to provide a word document containing their policy, which is 
still in development. The document, simply entitled Western Mental Health Assessment, 
is derived from a template provided by the Canadian Association of College and 
University Student Services (CACUSS). It is important to note that this guiding 
document has not been published and could not have been accessed without the 
assistance of the mental health service. Authors of the document were plentiful, including 
members of such services as Student Health Services, Housing and Ancillary Services, 
Western International, Campus Recreation Centre and the Chaplaincy, among others 
(though there is no indication of the proportion of representation among these 
departments, or who exactly had taken part). The document is particularly useful in 
identifying existing policies and programs (something few other universities have 
actually been clear on) and areas that are still in development. The framework identifies 
existing programs as “strengths,” and includes their code of student conduct, harassment 
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policy and Student Success Centre programs among their current relevant mental health 
tools. Of course, these services relate to mental health only peripherally (and the mention 
of the code of student conduct is questionable—is the code of conduct being used against 
students who would self-harm, as has been seen in other universities, or is the code of 
conduct being used for mentally ill students who would harm others?). The Student 
Success Centre is responsible for ensuring academic success—it is not a mental health 
service and has no trained health professionals on staff. Many of these strengths are also 
in the university’s residence based-programs, creating accessibility issues for those living 
off campus. Among the identified weaknesses were a need for more international student 
support, mental health education for educators and students and a voluntary/involuntary 
leave policy. The latter in-development area is mentioned twice in the framework, 
leading one to suspect that like Ryerson and other universities in Canada, Western may 
have encountered legal difficulties in the recent past regarding the involuntary suspension 
of mentally ill students. 
Evidently, in the area of mental health awareness, there is no recommended policy 
change, nor is there anything in development. The authors note that there exists mental 
health training for residence staff (not for other faculty, mind), a mental health app 
(bundled with the Western University app), several brochures, a mental health awareness 
week and annual fairs that focus on stress reduction. Indeed, the framework seems to 
emphasize the university’s strengths but few sections can point to weaknesses in their 
existing policies. Nor does it indicate how far along in development these policies may 
be. The authors seem to want only to ensure students and educators are made aware of 
the evidently perfectly adequate systems that are already in place. Further, there remains 
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a clear focus on stress and personal responsibility (it has its own section in the document 
and many listed assets are stress related in some way, such as fall and spring study 
breaks) rather than on illness treatment and professional services. This may be a 
mistake—or, at least, a misleading representation of the problem. While there is a 
documented link between academic stress and suicidality, this does not mean that one 
should be satisfied with attending only to that aspect of mental health. Moreover, said 
documented link is controversial: it is, for one, correlational. An increased sensitivity to 
stress and suicidality can, after all, be caused by depression and other mental illnesses, 
rather than the converse (which seems to be the impression the authors of the framework 
were under). Some researchers suggest that stress and suicide risk have a U-shaped 
relationship (Feskanich, Hastrup, Marshall, Colditz, Stampfer, Willett, & Kawachi, 
2002). That is, some individuals with minimal levels of stress also exhibit increased 
suicidality, a paradox that researchers attribute to some unidentified risk factor for 
suicide.  
 Further in the framework, it becomes obvious why a more holistic approach to 
mental health was evidently not considered. Much of the document’s data come from a 
health survey conducted at Western, the National College Health Assessment. The 
response rate for the survey was low (13% of the population), with the respondents being 
overwhelmingly White females. They reported that stress and anxiety were by far the 
most common hindrances to their academic success, almost exclusively so (however, the 
rates of self-reported depression were higher than the illnesses prevalence in the general 
population, though this may be a result of a poor understanding of what constitutes 
depression). Aside from the obvious respondent bias (are students who suffer from 
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mental distress more or less likely to complete the survey?), looking at the survey itself 
reveals issues that may have skewed the results. First, the survey is clearly not designed 
with a focus on mental health—less than two pages of the 12-page survey are devoted to 
the topic of mental health. And it is little wonder stress and anxiety dominated the results, 
as the survey questions focused on determining students’ general stress levels and the 
presence of difficult life events. The survey asked the respondents whether or not they 
had felt a number of negative feelings in the last 12 months—most of which are 
symptoms of depression or anxiety—before going on (in a later section) to ask about the 
impacts on the respondents’ academic performance. This sequence of stress-related 
questioning could prime the respondents for answers related to stress and anxiety (to say 
nothing of the fact that depression and anxiety were the only two mental disorders 
represented in this latter question). One wonders if a more focused test, such as a 
screening test for mental health disorders may have been of more use. As it stands, one 
cannot be sure existing or upcoming policy will address the true nature of the problem. 
University of Waterloo 
 Mental health services, a small division of Waterloo’s health services, provided 
little information as to what its services actually entailed, much less its internal guidelines 
and procedures. The page of collected university policies was as informative as its mental 
health services page, in that students would be able to find nothing regarding tragedy 
response, program guidelines, or even disability accommodation policies here. The only 
mention of mental health that could be found was a brief nod to mental health in the 
university’s privacy policy, which makes reference to the Ontario Mental Health Act (of 
1990) as a basis for its confidentiality policies. However, it should be noted that the 
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Ontario Mental Health Act provides guidelines for psychiatric institutions, not academic 
institutions, which may not meet the act’s definition of a care facility. Other universities 
that have made mention of this act (in particular, Wilfrid Laurier University and to a 
much lesser extent, the University of Ottawa) note the particular policies they are 
appropriating from the act and exactly what this entails for students. That level of clarity 
is absent at Waterloo. 
Like the University of Toronto and York University, the mental health services 
portion of the university website did not provide adequate contact information. However, 
there are other alternative contacts for students curious about policy. The privacy officer 
at Waterloo is responsible for enforcing policy surrounding privacy concerns at the 
university. The question remains as to how much of that work extended into mental 
health and how heavily the university relied on the Ontario Mental Health Act for policy. 
For instance, how accessible are student mental health records at the university? Do they 
operate under a system of “implied consent,” like other universities and could potential 
employers at the university access these records when choosing which students to hire? 
Under what circumstances could professors disclose information to mental health centres 
without student consent? For that matter, under what circumstances could mental health 
centres disclose information to outside parties (and parties of what sort—parents, outside 
mental health organizations, other universities the student may attend)? 
Waterloo’s privacy policies regarding mental health were informed by a 
document from the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario called “Disclosure 
of Information Permitted in Emergency or other Urgent Circumstances” (2005). Under 
this document, disclosure of student’s information to outside parties should theoretically 
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be rare and would only be done in the interest of public safety or other life-threatening 
circumstances. These, are, of course, minimum legal obligations on the part of the 
university. Waterloo does make some exceptions to the document: information could also 
be released to any party deemed relevant in an effort to eliminate or reduce a significant 
risk of serious bodily harm to a person. There exists no document to define what is 
considered “significant risk” or “serious bodily harm,” but the university does indicate 
that the harm mitigation clause applies to any harm the student may possibly inflict on 
themselves and does not solely refer to the student’s potential risk to others. Co-op 
employers at the university would not be allowed access to records under any 
circumstances and counseling services would retain student records on file for up to 10 
years after last contact with the patient. Mental health policy in general at the university 
is in a constant state of development and Waterloo expects to have some kind of guiding 
document of its own in the near future. The university recommended contacting 
counseling services to inquire as to the progression of that policy, as well as information 
regarding practices of the service, including operational definitions of key terms. 
Counseling services did not respond to my request for further information. 
Ryerson University 
 Ryerson’s policy is intriguing, as it is clear that there are policies in place at the 
university governing mental health but they are not publicly available. The university’s 
mental health awareness committee in 2013 published a review of those policies and 
made recommendations for reform but that report was not made available online. It was 
noted that a second, follow-up report would be published in 2014 but no mention of this 
report could be found. Like other universities, these elusive policies are not located on 
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any master policy list. Residence Community Standards mention self-endangerment but it 
is unclear if intentional self-harm could be disciplined under this policy, or if action 
would be limited to reckless behaviour (likely the intent of the provision). For that matter, 
both the Community Standards and the Student Code of Conduct fail to mention how 
violations that may be a result of mental illness would be approached. It remains likely, 
of course, that the code of conduct and residence community standards are the primary 
governing documents for mental health issues. Mental health services contain only basic 
referral guidelines, to say nothing of more in-depth policy, with many pages still under 
construction. The services pages make little mention of mental illness in favour of stress-
reduction techniques and services. As media have reported troubling interactions between 
Ryerson and mentally ill students (in particular, involuntary withdrawal policies and 
practices that make it difficult to resume studies after a leave of absence), clearly some 
policy is being enacted here—but perhaps it is an embarrassingly less than humanistic 
policy. 
 Mental health services had only a crisis line and appointment booking number 
(notably, urgent care was only available from 2-3 p.m.), with no contact information for 
inquiries. However, I was provided with what the university referred to as a lens that will 
be used to inform Ryerson’s policy, created in 2013 by the Ryerson Mental Health 
Advisory Committee. This policy lens (simply titled “Ryerson Mental Health Advisor 
Committee—Appendix”) is not to be confused with a policy document but indeed, is a 
precursor to the creation of policy. The purpose of the lens is to create policy that the 
Committee feels will “find the right balance between required rigor and standards in the 
classroom and the workplace and the needs of those who require flexibility, accessibility 
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and accommodation” (p. 3). That is to say, it intends to strike a balance between the 
rights of the student and the legal concerns of the university—not, as the document warns 
against, finding “which rights and responsibilities ‘trump’ one another” (p. 3). The four-
page document is comprised almost entirely of bulleted lists of broad guidelines and 
goals for policy creation (and only two pages of which contain any of these 
recommendations). This includes calls for greater accountability (for all parties, they 
suggest), clarity of policy and the equitable treatment of all students—much of which 
have indeed been missing from other policies I’ve examined. Considering the length of 
the text (four pages), as well as its nature as a preliminary review, very little else can be 
said about the document. The policies it informs could look very different depending 
upon policy makers’ interpretations of the guidelines. 
Ryerson's development of the policy lens was guided by an urgent need to 
act. The university had become aware of problems with its current polices based on 
first-hand reports from facilitators across the institution, who reported adverse 
effects on student mental health. Following the publication of this lens, the 
committee decided to deliberate further before pushing for policy reform, as they 
felt (rightfully so) that the literature surrounding mental health policies in 
postsecondary institutions was still extremely limited. The document remains the 
primary piece of work the Committee has put forth (despite the claim in the 
document itself that a new report would be published in 2014) and this fall (2015), 
they intend to present the lens to policy makers at Ryerson (along with any 
modifications they may have added since their two-year literature review). As the 
majority of the lens’ guidelines are sensible (though, again, broad and open to a 
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great degree of interpretation), one can hope that clear and accessible policies can 
be formed this very year. 
McMaster University 
 McMaster has no documentation related to mental health crisis management, or 
the procedures involved in treating mentally ill students on-campus. It does, however, 
have detailed procedures on how to refer students to mental health services on-campus 
(just not any information on what goes on once the students are there).  McMaster has 
collected this information in a document they call the Connections IV Orange Reference 
Folder, which is hosted from the mental health services resources page. The Orange 
Reference Folder is meant for staff and faculty and contains information on identifying 
and responding to symptoms of mental illness that may be visible in students. A physical 
version of the document is made available to all staff that interact directly with students. 
The information is certainly comprehensive, providing the contact information for 
individuals who are not only involved in mental health treatment but in legal affairs as 
well. The website also recommends students take concerns to the disability services 
office in addition to seeking help at the wellness centre. While the disability services 
webpage offers no information about exactly what support is offered for students with 
mental health issues, it is comforting that the university has acknowledged mental illness 
as a disability. Not all disability services documents I have examined include any 
mention of mental health whatsoever.  
McMaster (like many other universities) uses its code of conduct to address 
students engaging in self harm or suicidal thoughts. However, in 2013, McMaster 
updated their policy concerning code of conduct violations. If it is determined that the 
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code of conduct has been violated due to a student’s disability or illness (mental or 
physical), a different set of procedures apply. These exact procedures are not available 
online but McMaster claims they will take efforts to ensure the student can continue their 
studies if possible. It would seem the university is making a distinction between 
behaviour caused by a mental illness and behaviour caused by temporary mental health 
issues. This is a rare distinction to make for universities and it is made even more clear 
through the wellness centre website, which devotes a page to the definition and 
comparison of mental illness and mental health. While there may not be a publicly 
available, overarching policy document at McMaster, the recent changes to its code of 
conduct suggest a willingness to reform and its acknowledgement that mental illness is 
no reason to penalize students seems a fine foundation for policy. 
Also of note is the existence of the student-run organization COPE, which has 
spearheaded the creation of mental health events and mental illness educational seminars 
on-campus. Further, two McMaster students (Shema Tamboly, Bachelor of Health 
Sciences and Francois-Pierre Gauvin, PhD student in Health Research Methodology) led 
a 2013 mental health review entitled “Addressing Student Mental Health Needs at 
McMaster University.” This 63-page document is not hosted on McMaster’s website and 
indeed, was not connected to administration at McMaster at all. These students identified 
the same gaps in their university’s policy and practices that I have noted in other 
universities. Namely, a lack of communication between on-campus psychiatrists (who 
identify mental illness issues in students) and other staff (who, without training, may 
perceive symptoms as “behavioural problems” (p. 12)) can lead to students being 
penalized for suffering from their illness. This lack of communication between mental 
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health staff and other faculty is only made more difficult by privacy and confidentiality 
policy (which is why it is important to make note of when universities make exceptions 
to privacy regulations in their policy). Moreover, the students identify the absence of an 
overarching, formal policy document for the university. I believe such a formal document 
could serve as the basis for organizing initiatives and programs on-campus and ensuring 
services are adequately addressing the problems they were designed to handle. 
University of Guelph 
 While no proper policy document could be found through publicly available 
channels, the University of Guelph’s website contains some procedural information 
regarding mental health services and faculty referrals. Guelph uses a framework they 
refer to as A.L.E.R.T to handle professor--student mental health interactions. The 
acronym breaks down to: Acknowledge, in which faculty recognize a problem; Listen, in 
which the faculty member allows the student to explain the issue; Engage, in which the 
faculty member expresses concern and reassurance; Refer, in which the faculty member 
directs the student to mental health services on-campus; and Talk, where the faculty 
member follows up on the student’s progress by speaking with counseling services. The 
specifics of these steps remain vague, however. Impressively, like York University, 
Guelph also advertises its inclusion of mental health difficulties in its disability 
accommodation policy. Application forms for the program are available online and the 
service differentiates between mental illness (providing full disability accommodation) 
and temporary mental health difficulties (covered on a two-semester basis). Once again, 
the exact nature of this accommodation is unclear but in this case the omission is 
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purposeful—the university notes, perhaps appropriately so, that accommodations are 
highly individualized.  
Carleton University 
 The Student Mental Health Framework (2009) was found in the Office of the 
Vice President (Students and Enrolment) section of Carleton's official website. Notably, 
the framework is absent from the university policies list in the University Secretariat 
section of the website and cannot be found when one uses the site's search feature keyed 
to “policy” or “mental health” (which finds only the university’s environmental health 
policies). Only through manual navigation through the site could the document be found, 
where it is made clear that the framework is being used to inform current decisions at the 
university. No other policy documents occupy the Office of the Vice President’s section 
of the website, though the Vice President's office appears to function as a student aid 
service, which would at least explain why the framework is located here. To the 
university's credit, a link to the framework can be found under “Quick Links” on the 
Student and Enrolment web page. 
 The language of this document relies heavily on the concepts of risk mitigation 
and responsibility to students. It acknowledges early in the text that the university puts 
itself at legal risk when assisting students in need but claims that the risk can be lessened 
through training of faculty and administration in mental health care and through solid 
policies and procedures. While this certainly seems to be an admirable stance, they are 
also quick to point out that mental health services are not the primary responsibility of the 
university and that legally, “the university is not held to the same provision of service 
standard as are organizations whose primary function is to assist people with mental 
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health problems” (p. 16). For a policy that assures legal consequences can be minimized 
by genuine quality care (and that humanitarian concerns are "over and above" legal 
requirements), this paragraph explaining how the administration should not be held 
legally accountable is particularly conspicuous. This is after several additional paragraphs 
outlining the legal risks and potential damage to the university's reputation when assisting 
in cases of mental illness.  
Further, the framework discusses the inherent limitations of its own mental health 
services: evidently, they are intended for on-campus emergency service rather than long-
term care. If the situation is not an emergency but requires more than mere guidance, the 
university suggests off-campus help may be more appropriate. With all the effort this 
document puts into mental health reform, evidently expansion of services and 
accessibility isn't part of the plan. Carleton is turning away a large portion of mentally ill 
students with this narrow focus and it may be best for suffering students to look 
elsewhere for treatment as they suggest—Carleton goes on to discourage help seeking by 
citing its long wait times for nonemergency situations. The university itself acknowledges 
the difficulty inherent in this plan: psychiatrists are not often covered by provincial health 
insurance (and if they are, it is rarely in full) and not at all by the Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan. Students paying for Carleton's already considerable tuition fees may be 
unable to afford seeking help off campus. Still, the framework recommends students 
"check their private health benefits for coverage" (p.18), as they are surely not one to 
provide a suitable alternative. If the mental health services are so poor, through the 
document's own admission, why is it the policy largely addresses referral strategies and 
emergency aid, rather than addressing the failing of the existing system? For that matter, 
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quality staff training and emergency aid will likely do very little to prevent tragedy if the 
system is not designed for long term treatment. Their subsequent explanation of on-
campus services confirms the university's focus on stress-reduction programs, academic 
guidance and lighter forms of counseling. There are only a handful of psychologists in 
their employ and no mention of any psychiatrists at all. 
Interestingly, Carleton notes that for privacy concerns, they are legally bound to 
adhere to Ontario's Freedom of Information and Privacy Act and the Personal Health 
Information Protection Act. These are documents the other frameworks neglect to 
mention. And while Carleton's policies on privacy are not unlike those of other 
institutions, it is clear Carleton is concerned about the legal obligations surrounding the 
handling of information. So much so indeed that administrators have been put in charge 
of the decision surrounding when an exception to the privacy policy is appropriate: 
A senior Carleton University official such as Director of University Safety,  
Director of Housing and Conference Services, Assistant Director of Residence  
Life, Director of Health and Counseling Services, Associate Vice President 
(Students and Enrolment) or their designates who employs appropriate judgement  
and who carefully considers the implications of informing a third party about a 
Carleton student’s health or other personal information can elect to disclose 
personal information without consent. (pp. 29-30). 
Among these administrators who can make these exceptions, it is notable that no medical 
professionals are present (who could sufficiently judge the level of severity in a given 
case and recommend if outside intervention is necessary or even helpful). Even the 
university Privacy Officer is absent from this list, though the position plays a critical role 
77 
 
 
 
in creating privacy policy and interpreting the legal obligations put forward by Ontario's 
information privacy acts. The acts in question are indeed up for some amount of 
interpretation, especially in academic settings. This could explain why other universities 
do not refer to them: the documents are clearly designed for use in a clinical 
environment—an environment that academic institutions traditionally claim to have little 
to do with in their own campuses. The provisions for nonhealth care professionals’ 
potential handling of sensitive information is complex to say the least. Generally, health 
care professionals are also regulated by the College of Physicians and Surgeons when it 
comes to disclosure of information; these are regulations academic institutions are 
obviously not bound by. Primarily, disclosure of information for clinicians is handled by 
a "circle of care," which is loosely defined as those individuals who have some relation to 
the primary well-being of the patient. What this means in an academic sense is up for 
debate. Are professors a part of a student's circle of care? Their residence administrators? 
The dean of student affairs? Mentioning Ontario's confidentiality documents here raises a 
number of problems for Carleton and it calls attention to the apparent lack of the 
university's own privacy policy to cover the gaps left behind by the government 
frameworks. 
The Carleton framework goes on to outline genuinely quality advice for faculty to 
identify and recommend students to the mental health services (which, remember, exist 
primarily for emergency or guidance purposes). It encourages faculty to remain in contact 
with both the student and the mental health offices to check on the student's progression 
but stumbles at the last hurdle when it advises against getting too involved in the student's 
problems—likely for legal reasons. In general, Carleton's policy appears to be one in 
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which surface-level attention is given to the problem of mental health, largely through 
awareness campaigns and faculty training programs, all while their existing mental health 
services flounder. It is a cost-effective solution to be sure, though it would appear it is 
much more talk than it is action.   
Queen’s University 
 The Student Mental Health Framework (2012) was found on the Queen’s 
University website, though like Carleton, required some amount of counter-intuitive 
navigation. The page cannot be navigated to through links on the home page but rather, 
by using the built-in search engine to locate the Principal's Commission on Mental 
Health, which hosts the document. It is worth noting that the document cannot be found 
on the pages for Health, Counseling and Disability Services; Administration and 
Governance; nor even the University Wide Policy Library, all of which can be found 
much more easily than the Principal's Commission on Mental Health. It may be worth 
noting that through the aforementioned Policy Library, the public is encouraged to view 
and even comment on policy as it develops. For whatever reason, this framework, being 
located elsewhere, is presumably exempted from that practice. 
 After the series of on-campus suicides at Queen’s in 2010 (particularly after the 
tragic case of Jack Windeler, mentioned previously), the attention of the university had 
turned to mental health. This document was likely drafted as a response to critics of their 
2010 mental health services, an assumption reinforced by the mention of the 2010 and 
2011 deaths in the framework's introduction and the fact that the document had only been 
in development for a year prior to publishing. Of key importance to this framework is the 
concept of transitions. To Queen’s, most mental health challenges on-campus arise from 
79 
 
 
 
stressful transitions (rather than genetic or biological factors, as substantive research 
suggests), transitions such as high school to university and undergraduate to graduate 
studies. “Transitions” exists as one tier of a four-tiered pyramid structure that the 
framework puts forth. The authors insist that no one tier of the pyramid is more important 
than any other (though one must then question why a pyramid structure would be used at 
all). Despite the claim, the authors devote more pages to the topic of transitions than any 
other in the document.  
Providing support during challenging times is undoubtedly the focus of the 
framework's authors. This strangely specific focus calls to mind the case of Jack 
Windeler, as one of the issues leading to Windeler's suicide was, as peers noted, a 
stressful transition from high school to university. Once again, this is further evidence 
that Queen’s policy is reactionary, not proactive. One can understand the danger in 
focusing solely on the failures of the past—after all, does Windler's experience typify 
suicidal ideation, or should we look to a more complex range of causes and possibilities? 
Is it possible that instead of working from a single oversimplified cause (and there are 
many causes), we can find a solution that attends to a more diverse population? Indeed, 
following from the stressful transition theory, the solutions outlined by the framework are 
more of the same stress-reduction programs seen elsewhere. While surely well and good, 
these programs perhaps do not have the same benefits as an increase in availabile mental 
health resources, nor do these programs help those with serious issues feel legitimized or 
taken seriously when no alternative program is provided for more serious illness. Indeed, 
much of the problem seems to be that the authors of the framework have bought into the 
notion that mental health problems arise simply because students can't handle the stresses 
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of everyday life, that they are not tough enough, or lack “resilience” (something that, 
presumably, healthy individuals have more of). The authors note, “The commission 
recommends formal and informal programs be encouraged and developed in recognition 
of the need to foster resilience, so that students become equipped to address the various 
challenges that are inevitable during and beyond, this stage of their lives” (p. 36). This is 
not to say that stress-related mental health issues are not a reality, merely that those who 
suffer from clinical (undiagnosed or diagnosed) mental disorders may grow frustrated in 
programs that insist recovery is a matter of willpower, when what they really need is 
medical care.  
 When useful advice arises, it arises in the form of “recommendations,” which are 
merely that: vague goals such as “The commission recommends the university, faculty 
and staff associations and unions consider a program in which trained and identified 
faculty/TA/staff contacts exist in each department to assist their colleagues (like First 
Aid/Occupational Health and Safety/Equity)” (p. 21) or “the programs should be oriented 
so that everyone knows how to identify and refer a [person] in need,” (p. 21) which, 
while genuinely useful and admirable goals, provide little information on how one can go 
about achieving them. In the case of the latter recommendation (faculty should have 
programs to identify and refer students in need), no referral or identification procedure 
was ever identified. To Queen's credit, the commission also recommends increasing the 
number of on-staff psychiatrists; however, it is unclear if this recommendation will ever 
be followed up on. Recommendations, of course, are not policy but merely exist to 
inform it. The document itself illustrates how slowly Queen’s is adopting the 
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recommendations outlined here: “Queen’s has started to move to this model but not 
strategically or systematically” (Queen’s, 2012, p. 42). 
 Neoliberalism is not absent from the framework. Early on in the document, it is 
made clear that certain accommodations will not (or cannot) be made for mentally ill 
students with sudden, undiagnosed, or misdiagnosed problems. The university notes it is 
“legally obligated under the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act” to 
accommodate those registered with their Disability Services Office (which requires 
internal recommendation and has already seen a 243% increase in student activity in the 
last four years—one can imagine the wait times). However, they go on to say “there is no 
policy or process to guide professors, staff and students for nonDSO cases” (p. 14). The 
implication, then, is that the university is doing only what they are legally obligated to 
and nothing further. Though the DSO is overburdened and is still operating without strict 
guidelines (the framework recommends the office create reasonable and consistent 
accommodations in the future, implying they had been operating more or less on a case-
by-case basis) and there is simply nothing in place to help students left out of the system, 
the concern appears to be meeting minimum legal requirements. Indeed, as is the case in 
many of the universities without clear policy in this area, professors and staff generally 
use their own discretion when handling mental health issues in the classroom, usually 
without the benefit of guidance or training in the area. While the framework may have set 
out to correct this kind of thinking in policy (that is to say, taking the responsibility off 
the educators, though not necessarily allocating it anywhere else), nothing has changed as 
of yet. 
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Wilfrid Laurier University 
 Once again, in searching primary lists of policy at Wilfrid Laurier, I came up 
empty handed. This was perhaps unsurprising, as many of their policies haven’t been 
updated since 1996 or earlier. The mental health services information proved equally 
troubling.  Sparse information aside, the centre has only a single on-staff psychiatrist to 
service the university’s entire population. Even then, the psychiatrist only sees students 
on referral from the Wellness centre physician and only by appointment. There was no 
indication of how long the process of arranging an appointment would take. Despite this 
shortcoming, the centre did have a remarkably clear and sensible privacy policy. 
Disclosure to parties outside the university for any reason can only be done through 
signed written consent from the student and while there is some amount of “implied 
consent” for noncrisis situations, the university outlines exactly what is meant by this. 
The unviersity’s “implied consent” can allow communication between disability services 
and mental health services, which is not always possible in universities. Without this 
communication, students may have difficulty getting academic help for their mental 
disabilities. Of note is the university’s behavioural intervention team, which responds to 
crisis situations on-campus involving mental health. It was unclear to me, however, in 
what circumstances a faculty member would call this team instead of campus security or 
even the mental health centre itself. For that matter, the team’s operating hours do not 
extend beyond ordinary operating hours for the mental health centre, so it is not for the 
benefit of after-hours emergency response. It is possible this is a suicide intervention 
team but the university is hardly forthcoming in admitting to that, for whatever reason. 
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That said, it is interesting that this team should exist but nowhere does it outline how they 
operate or what regulations govern their behaviour. 
Brock University 
 Like most universities on this list, Brock University does not have definitive 
mental health policy, despite hosting a number of active mental health programs and 
awareness campaigns. To the credit of the university, it developed a tentative mental 
health framework in 2012 but not only was the document unfinished, it has presumably 
been abandoned completely. The mental health commission assembled to complete the 
framework no longer exists and the framework is no longer hosted on the main website. 
Mental health services information is slim but this is perhaps understandable: all of 
Brock’s counseling is provided by a third-party psychiatric company with its own set of 
policies and guidelines. Not only does this allow the university to operate without policy 
in this area, it also distances the university from legal repercussions in the event of a 
tragedy. This is not a complaint—operating through an outside firm allows Brock’s 
mental health service to have some of the most student-friendly and accessible privacy 
information of all the universities in Ontario. The service can appropriate their policy 
from the Ontario Mental Health act without having to worry about concerns such as in 
loco parentis, or if they are a true care facility. The two psychiatrists and one mental 
health nurse the company provides work alongside the 14 other physicians in Student 
Health Services. 
Notably, Brock is among the universities to practice the use of antisuicide 
contracts in its residences (and also its counseling centres), which will be discussed in 
Chapter Six. This policy of issuing contracts is largely handled through residence 
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guidelines and policies, rather than any mental health policy. Given the university's lack 
of mental health policy, it is often these peripheral policies that pick up the slack. Brock's 
student code of conduct seems to play a critical role in guiding the institution's responses 
to mental health. The university's code of conduct explicitly refers to cases in which 
mental illness may be addressed using a disciplinary system. Indeed, students in this 
model are referred to as "at-risk" individuals and threats against oneself are clearly 
included in the code's definition of at-risk behaviour to be addressed. This suicidal 
ideation (or mere self harm) is a Level 3 threat, the highest priority tier (on the same level 
as violence against another student), wherein the student may face consequences such as 
involuntary leave for one academic year or longer. Students are considered at-risk even if 
it is believed they may at some future point become a threat to themselves. Issues are 
meant to be decided by a Students-at-Risk Case Team, the membership of which is 
unclear. It is unlikely they are associated with the mental health service and the team 
meets and discusses cases with the Manager of Residence Life and Student Affairs, 
ensuring the process has strong ties to administration. While this may seem cold and 
legalistic, especially considering mental illness and delinquent behaviour are being 
unfortunately associated, Brock explains that attending to at-risk behaviour isn't 
straightforward and that the possible contribution of mental illness to student behaviour 
has been considered: 
Addressing the conduct of a student-at-risk can pose unique challenges to the  
University where that student has a mental or physical disability that is 
contributing to the “at-risk” behaviour. The University acknowledges that it has a 
duty to accommodate a student with a disability, in accordance with provincial 
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law and University policy. (Brock University, 2010, para. 79)  
This level of accommodation, the university notes, may not be possible given limited 
resources or available services. Further, its duty to accommodate (legally, they note) 
extends only to the point of "undue hardship," and hence it can be influenced by factors 
such as cost and perceived continuation of risk. It cannot be overstated, however, how a 
disciplinary code is not to be relied on as a primary means of handling issues of suicidal 
ideation on-campus. Clearly the goal when mentally ill students are caught in this system 
is to accommodate the student rather than punish them—the policy is far from 
malevolent—but students in the system may rightfully wonder why they are dealing with 
code of conduct violations when they have done nothing wrong. It also ultimately leaves 
administrators who are used to dealing with delinquent students with ill students they 
may not be trained to handle and may find it easier to ignore the mental health component 
of their actions. Both the case review process and the appeals process seem complicated 
(and multi-staged) and it would not be difficult to imagine students getting lost in the 
bureaucracy involved. 
Finally, it should also be noted that while Brock has publicly announced it is 
undergoing mental health reform, this largely amounts to the formation of a committee 
(whose sole purpose is to regulate the additional funding collected from graduate students 
and ensure it is spent on some form of mental health service) and a number of proposed 
stress-management programs. 
The student union does not expect new policy will be developed in the coming 
year, despite the increase in mental health funding and despite having no dedicated 
mental health documents beyond an unimplemented 2012 framework. The student union 
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is also not involved in any upcoming policy decisions. A more active group in policy 
making would be on-campus residence services, who, unlike the student union, see 
representation on review boards and crisis response teams. The Student Health Service 
operates under stricter policies than does residence (primarily, the strong privacy policy 
that was made available on their website). That said, where serious mental health issues 
arise, it still runs largely on a case-by-case basis, using the Ontario Mental Health act as a 
loose guide. 
 University of Windsor 
 Mental health is not mentioned among the university secretariat’s list of policies 
at Windsor, which is otherwise quite exhaustive. Their mental health services page is 
unfortunately quite bare bones, with little to help inquisitive students, let alone those 
curious about policies and practices. While fairly sparse, the university Student Wellness 
Centre page did include a contact e-mail for inquiries concerning practices and policies. 
However, the Wellness Centre did not respond to my request for more information.  
Other Universities 
 The McGill University SSMU Mental Health Policy (2014) is included in this 
review for its interesting connections to other policy documents and its core concepts that 
are indicative of the direction mental health policy is developing. This is despite the 
document being from a university outside Ontario. Unlike most of the other documents in 
this review, it is referred to as a policy, not a mere framework. This is another important 
distinction and a key reason why McGill was chosen for inclusion in this paper. I wished 
to compare a completed policy document to the frameworks collected in this review and I 
could not do so given the lack of mental health policy at Ontario universities. 
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The McGill University SSMU Mental Health Policy could not be found on 
McGill's website proper, even under the university's official policy listings on the 
Secretariat's page. However, a check of McGill's organizations and associations revealed 
that its student society webpage hosts the document, where it was much easier to find 
than many of the other policy documents on this list. One wonders, however, if students 
and faculty would know to turn to the student organizations for policy information.  
Unfortunately, the policy document still builds off much the same flawed 
structure as the previously discussed frameworks. In fact, it makes explicit mention of the 
Queen’s University framework and uses much the same language in its statement of 
purpose. This is somewhat troubling, even if both institutions are genuinely well-
intentioned—illnesses and issues that have caught the administration's eye at one location 
may not be as prevalent in another. This is not to say that good policy is not 
generalizable, merely that the ability to generalize is hindered if one institution is creating 
policy that is in some respect reactionary. One institution may find itself addressing 
problems it isn't actually facing. This is to say nothing of the fact that borrowing elements 
from another institution's framework may indicate the university was unwilling to create 
a policy tailored to their own environment (though not necessarily). While the borrowing 
is surely not extensive and much of the policy remains unique to McGill, the document 
itself is a mere eight pages, including several pages of references. Filling space with 
reference to other university plans does not go unnoticed.  
 More to the point, McGill goes on to comment on its own existing mental health 
service. The university regretfully notes that it can't expand the operation of the 
overburdened campus mental health service due to “budgetary and governmental 
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restrictions” (p. 4)—though it doesn't specify what kind of restrictions the latter might 
refer to. Instead, several programs and initiatives are to be put in place and governed 
through this policy—though no rules or guidelines actually exist in the document, rather, 
broad “goals” are presented that outline what the programs hope to achieve. One such 
goal is attention to resources. While new resources evidently can not be generated, the 
university is willing to work on expanding access to, improving the quality of and 
fostering collaboration between existing resources. For which, of course, a fee will be 
collected to fund the programs that allow such a change to occur. The act of expanding 
access to campus resources seems to rely on mere awareness on the part of the students 
that these (overburdened) resources exist—which is understandable. After all, let us not 
forget that the services themselves cannot expand to accommodate a larger student 
population. Awareness, then, is the second overarching goal of the reform. The third and 
final goal is advocacy and solidarity, through which programs will be created to 
encourage students to take the initiative and take the fight for mental health care into their 
own hands. It also includes group therapy programs and research programs; however, it is 
the promotion of student advocacy that intrigues me. It implies that the policy is subject 
to change at the collective will of the student population, which is likely a strength of the 
sparse document. It is possible the policy is vague for exactly this reason—McGill 
intends to forge the details as they go along.  
The document also suggests the university provide a platform for suffering 
individuals so that they may be given a voice. This proposition may be a strong ending 
for the document but it remains unclear thanks to the point-form text and vague language 
if this is what McGill, in fact, intends to provide students. Given their inclusion of student 
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organizations in other areas of policy, it seems likely this interpretation is correct. Still, 
this is an example of a document that is not sure where it is going, with broadly defined 
goals, unsure of what kind of specific policy may be appropriate. It borrows language 
from other frameworks to assist it in its efforts to understand the issues. If anything, this 
supports the idea that mental health is uncharted territory for many policy makers. Absent 
here is mention of procedures or training for faculty, or protocol for acutely distressed or 
actively suicidal students. 
Discussion 
Finding definitive policy through publicly available channels at Ontario 
universities proved to be challenging and it would appear (as suggested previously in my 
literature review), that many higher education institutions are handling instances of 
mental illness on-campus on a case-by-case basis with only minimal guidelines.  Where 
documentation can be found, it is in preliminary stages of development and not currently 
being used to inform policy decisions. 
This lack of accountability on the part of many Canadian universities is frankly 
disturbing. Why would documents outlining protocol in the case of physical illness be 
available for students and faculty but not mental illness? The only plausible explanations 
seem to be that the policy isn’t available because it simply does not exist, or where it does 
exist, the institution is aware of its controversial and somewhat less than humanistic 
nature. I am inclined to believe the former explanation (although the practically hidden 
nature of some of these documents perhaps points to the latter), as most Ontario 
universities have announced that an effort will at least be made for reform of some kind, 
though such efforts have clearly only just begun. 
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The incomplete nature of these documents makes deduction of an argument 
difficult. I believe one would be incorrect to, for instance, use these policy frameworks as 
examples to prove Apple (2001) and Power’s (1994) theories of neoliberalism correct. 
While these documents do contain strong elements of neoliberal thought, there is simply 
not enough to form a complete and solid argument. This is the reason I turned to narrative 
policy analysis to review these documents. Narrative policy analysis allowed me to look 
at the document holistically to determine the underlying narrative, which is useful in 
predicting how the documents may look when completed. Ultimately, this method has led 
to are more complex argument: The lack of interest university administrators seem to 
show for these documents and their completion is as damaging for students as overly 
neoliberal policy would be. While the conclusion is similar, the difference, here, is that 
the process is inductive, not deductive. Neoliberalism is still useful as an explanation for 
why the policy is developing the way it is, but it is not a presumed in advance that the 
policies are, in fact, neoliberal.  
 Of particular interest was the finding that many universities rely on peripheral 
documents such as student codes of conduct and residence guidelines as a form of mental 
health policy. While there is perhaps little else that can be relied on while waiting for 
policy to be developed, these documents are often not designed to handle mental health 
issues, to say nothing of mental illness, leaving much to the interpretation of the 
administrators or faculty at the time of incident. However, while waiting for major policy 
reform to take place, many of these peripheral documents have been updated to account 
for the burden placed upon them. 
In early 2013, McMaster University introduced revisions to its Student Code of  
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Conduct that create new processes for students whose breach of the code is 
thought to be primarily health related. In circumstances where student behaviour 
is primarily related to a health condition, the Dean of Students may divert the 
student to a different set of procedures. While many of the same procedures 
apply, the student attends a review meeting rather than a formal hearing. If the 
behaviour in question is determined to be primarily related to a health condition, 
the university commits to making “reasonable efforts” to enable the student to 
continue their studies, including provision of accommodations. In some cases, the 
student may be asked or required to temporarily discontinue studies until certain 
conditions are met or a certain amount of time has passed. (Olding & Yip, 2014, 
p. 17) 
While not ideal, there is recognition that quality policy is urgently needed and any steps 
to accommodate students while policy makers are still testing the waters are likely a 
positive change.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY CONCEPT—IN LOCO PARENTIS 
 
The debate surrounding mental health policy reform (particularly following the 
Shin case) and the reluctance of some institutions to implement policy that truly aids the 
mentally ill, boils down to an issue of whether there exists a duty of care on the part of 
universities. Legally, this duty of care is referred to as in loco parentis, meaning "in place 
of the parent." It refers to the responsibility on the part of an institution to act in the best 
interests of those in their care, to regulate their actions for moral or safety reasons as if 
the institution were a parental figure. Typically, in loco parentis is used in cases involving 
the care of a legal minor but it has a long and involved history at postsecondary 
institutions. Considering modern universities have a great number of nontraditionally 
aged or graduate students, in loco parentis and its parent-like policies may seem outdated. 
However, in loco parentis is not a mere historical policy anomaly but indeed, it has seen a 
resurgence in modern postsecondary policy (Stoehr, 2011; White, 2007). So much so, in 
fact, that the idea is now a key part of any legal discussion where the university finds 
itself being held responsible for on-campus tragedy—clearly it is has become a key force 
once again in driving university policy decisions, with clear implications for developing 
mental health policy.  
During its evolution as a policy concept, in loco parentis has changed somewhat 
in appearance to take on legalistic tone—no longer a humanistic concept but a wholly 
neo-liberal one (Stoehr, 2011). To this end, understanding the history of in loco parentis 
is critical in understanding what has shaped the policy, what it looks like now and how it 
is affecting university policies.  In what follows, I will outline the evolution of the idea of 
in loco parentis, show how it is still relevant to the discussion today and show how it has 
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become part of a new contracting and audit centric culture. In loco parentis is the core 
stated value behind much of the mental health policy reform seen today—though the 
desire to maintain a duty of care is not always expressed clearly by the policy tools used 
to put the concept into practice.  
Early in the history of the North American university, the concept of in loco 
parentis was at its strongest. In the mid to late 1800s, the philosophy of in loco parentis 
influenced policies on ethical and moral standards for university students—students could 
be penalized to the point of expulsion for not measuring up to their institution's standards 
in their personal lives, or for displaying a perceived weakness in character. These policies 
included curfews and even regulations on which eating establishments were acceptable 
for students to give patronage (Lee, 2011). University administrators argued that they 
were responsible for the moral development of their students as much as they were the 
academic development and courts agreed. A 1913 ruling stated:  
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral  
wellbeing and mental training of the pupils and we are unable to see why, to that 
end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or betterment 
of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or 
regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a matter left solely to the discretion of 
the authorities or parents. (Bowden, 2007, p. 482) 
In loco parentis trumped even constitutional rights in both private and public institutions, 
with courts confirming that accepting entry into postsecondary institutions is an inherent 
agreement that one relinquishes some amount of control to the university (Lee, 2011). 
But this was not merely extension of university values, it was a legal tool. In loco parentis 
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was, after all, not being cited to protect the rights of students as a parent would protect 
their child from harm (and indeed, was never intended to serve a truly protective 
function) but rather, as a legal defense when universities chose to discipline their students 
as they saw fit (Henning 2007). 
The 1960s brought change to the long-standing in loco parentis era, as students 
contested the heavy-handed regulation inspired by in loco parentis. With this unease 
came lawsuits—universities in the United States were taking disciplinary action against 
protesters and the students fought back with legal action. Dixon v. Alabama State Board 
of Education (1961) set the precedent for the discrediting of in loco parentis in secondary 
schools, which spelled the beginning of the end for the concept in postsecondary 
institutions. In this case, the court ruled that educators of secondary school children and 
younger did not have the right to punish students in the same way a parent would for 
misbehavior—a ruling in direct opposition to one made decades earlier.  
The protesters would eventually get their wish and by the late 1970s the 
pendulum had swung the other way. Rather than a university culture where students were 
seen as persons in the care of mentors and superiors, now students were completely 
independent in all but their academics and universities became uncomfortable in 
responding to any issue unrelated to academics. Institutions would not accept 
responsibility for any tragedy occurring on-campus and courts, once again, supported the 
universities, noting a few exceptions. This began what scholars such as Phillip Lee 
(2011) refer to as the bystander era. This new era brought with it new issues for students. 
Even in cases where hazing and underage drinking were proving dangerous issues on-
campus, universities refused to get involved with what they felt was the student's 
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responsibility, rather than a lack of rigidity or supervision. A 1981 ruling (to contrast the 
ruling from decades prior) stated, in response to a case of underage drinking on-campus 
that led to a student becoming a quadriplegic: "Only by giving them responsibilities can 
students grow into adulthood. Although the alleged lack of supervision had a disastrous 
result to this plaintiff, the overall policy of stimulating student growth is in the public 
interest" (Lee, 2011, p. 78). 
Yet, it became clear that hazing rituals and other dangerous behaviour on-campus 
could not be ignored and that some kind of regulation or supervision needed to occur to 
prevent undue tragedy. This revelation was not unprompted—a shift in court rulings 
suddenly had universities being held responsible for injuries sustained on-campus, 
shattering the bystander model of student-administrator relationships (Henning, 2007). It 
is important to note that these rulings were made based on what the courts found to be 
negligence, rather than a change in the way the courts viewed in loco parentis—
nonethless, these rulings indicated that universities could in fact be held responsible for 
injuries. Further, as universities became more like businesses seeking customers, it was 
necessary to appeal increasingly to both potential students and their parents. As parents 
began to take a greater interest in college-aged children's activities, so too did universities 
find a renewed interest in keeping those students safe (and parents placated; Bowden, 
2007). And so, the bystander era would not be the death of in loco parentis. While 
scholars are quick to point out that we have not seen a full return of in loco parentis, there 
has been recent recognition among courts and universities alike that there is some duty of 
care owed to students (Bowden, 2007). Indeed, elements of the philosophy have been 
brought back cautiously and with a new legalistic framework. Universities now have a 
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duty of care where it can be proven reasonable. Cases where underage drinking on-
campus resulted in injury would still be likely ruled in favour of the university, as they 
were in the bystander era but a more thorough investigation into the reasonable 
preventative measures taken by the institution would be in order before such a ruling 
would be made (Lee, 2011). The concept does make appearances in modern court cases 
and though it is usually cited only in cases involving primary and secondary education, 
increasing regulations on alcohol use and residence conduct bring the concept into play at 
a postsecondary level (Bowden, 2007).  
With increasing pressure from parents, postsecondary institutions are accepting a 
greater level of responsibility for their students, even if the concept of in loco parentis is 
not being mentioned by name. What has resulted is a kind of contract model, whereby 
administrators create a set of regulations (typically through a student code of conduct) on 
the nonacademic lives of students. One agrees to the nonnegotiable terms that the 
institution has put forward merely by agreeing to attend the school. In this way, 
administrators can say that students are being protected (rules have been put in place for 
their protection, after all) without the need for constant supervision. 
What does this mean for developing mental health policy in Ontario? It is clear 
that questions of in loco parentis and its modern relevance are not limited to the 
campuses of the United States. While the key case for mental health and in loco parentis 
may have been Shin v. MIT, Canadian universities have had their share of similar 
lawsuits and public tragedies. The death of Jack Windeler at Queen’s, as previously 
discussed, has been so influential as to be mentioned as a key factor in that university's 
policy development. Tragedies like these have not only prompted calls for reform, for 
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adequate services and competent policy to govern them but also, perhaps unfortunately, 
pointed fingers of blame. The danger comes into play when one confuses reckless 
behaviour (often the result of poor decision making on the part of the student, a legal 
adult) with mental health issues (where it is problematic to shift responsibility onto the 
sufferer and legal age has little to do with the issue). The call for greater duty of care and 
accountability for mentally ill students may echo the call for supervision of hazing and 
underage drinking but the issue of mental health proves more complicated, at least in a 
legal sense. While some scholars associate suicidality with underage drinking and 
disorderly conduct (in that these activities are a conscious choice on the part of the 
individual to break established codes of conduct for some reason or other) (Sweeton & 
Davis, 2004) and it is clear like-minded individuals exist among policy makers, suicide 
should be considered foremost a health problem. Further, to assume those with suicidal 
ideation are making a choice to feel the way they do, when it may instead be a symptom 
of mental illness (over which the individual has little control) is troubling to say the least. 
In this review, every available policy framework document indicated that accommodation 
for mentally ill students where possible was not only necessary but in keeping with the 
core values of the university. But with high risk of tragedy involved with mentally ill 
students (and by extension, legal backlash from parents or classmates) and a lack of clear 
policy precedents for identification, treatment and accommodation, it is tempting for 
universities to play the bystander once again and simply avoid liability.  
Unfortunately, even for universities that actively seek to improve policies and 
better accommodate students, there are no easy answers. Researcher Randall Bowden 
(2007) outlines several ways universities can create policy to address the issue of duty in 
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his text "Evolution of Responsibility: From In Loco Parentis to Ad Meliora Vertamur." 
The frameworks discussed in this review have this very goal, often stated explicitly as a 
duty of care: a sometimes legal, sometimes humanitarian effort to accommodate and 
protect students in need. Bowden states that the first goal in creating modern policy that 
addresses a reasonable duty of care is to define what the policy makers view as a student. 
The student-administration relationship cannot be built upon without this key defining of 
terms. Is the student a consumer in a capitalist model of education? Is a student merely 
any individual completing coursework? Each definition comes with its own inherent 
expectations and rights (the right to a quality product, etc.). Among the frameworks, 
student as a definition appears to be assumed. Some differentiate between student and 
nonstudent care levels but hardly linger on the definition. Second, Bowden suggests, 
there should be campus-wide distribution of information regarding the full extent of 
academic and nonacademic relationships. In this, many of the frameworks make a clear 
effort, suggesting a network of informed and trained individuals in each faculty that could 
serve this purpose. Third, Bowden calls for policy that is comprehensive but not so rigid 
as to interfere unduly with students’ personal lives. This is of course a difficult balance 
and recognized as a primary concern in the policy frameworks of Ontario's major 
universities. The University of Toronto's framework notes it will be adopting a systems 
model to help it with exactly this difficulty. That is, it will address multiple facets of 
policy on multiple levels to attend to a variety of possible mental health issues. Fourth, 
Bowden argues for clear lines of authority. Who has the authority to enact policies put in 
place? Even in universities where mental health training is provided to professors or other 
staff, actual procedure or authority to act is not always clear. What authority do 
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instructors have in assisting with mental health issues? Or other faculty, for that matter? 
Are mental health professionals given authority over mental health issues, or are these 
issues largely handled by administrators? While many frameworks touch on referral 
guidelines for instructors or residence staff, none truly break down the hierarchy of the 
proposed policy changes. As a parting note, Bowden cautions students to be aware of the 
limitations of the university in accommodating students and for policies to make clear to 
students that they must be held responsible for their actions where appropriate. I will say 
simply that most frameworks examined do, indeed, highlight the limitations of the 
university's care system and promote students to take responsibility for their own help 
where possible. 
The relationship between student and administration is one that has undergone a 
considerable back and forth over the history of postsecondary institutions. We are poised 
now in the middle of a strange era for concepts like in loco parentis: not quite gone but 
clearly the relationship does not resemble what it once was. With policy makers unsure of 
what will become of the student-administrator relationship less than a decade into a 
postbystander era of legal policy, it is little wonder reform is slow and cautious. 
Moreover, the sudden change in legal procedure bears a strong correlation to the change 
in the student-administrator relationship from academic to consumer-like. As one scholar 
explains, “[the trend] reflects the intense marketplace competition among institutions and 
a recognition that students have economic and property interests which deserve legal 
protection” (Melear, 2003, p. 125). No longer is in loco parentis concerned with 
protection of the moral integrity of the student but rather, the financial interests of the 
university as a business and in upholding the rights of the consumer. What has become 
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clear is that administrators are taking no chances with potential lawsuits. Where in loco 
parentis can be found, it is as a policy concept divorced, at least partially, with practice—
a friendly idea, a concept of parental care to present to potential consumers of education. 
The real ideology emerges in practice. 
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CHAPTER SIX: POLICY TOOL—ANTISUICIDE CONTRACT 
 
If the long-standing application of in loco parentis has moved from a strict, 
controlling parental model to a neo-liberal model (where administrators take partial 
responsibility for student care but do so very carefully and from behind formal legal 
policy), what does this mean specifically for the student? That is to say, when a 
university extends its duty of care to a student in mental distress, what does it look like?  
In student residences and mental health centres alike, a given university's go-to initial 
policy tool is unsurprisingly a very bureaucratic one. Practically embodying the 
contracting and auditing culture, the antisuicide contract is a faux-legal document 
administered as a first line of care to students who self-harm or who administrators 
suspect of suicidal ideation. The antisuicide contract is a difficult tool to discuss, as 
research surrounding its use (particularly in an academic setting) has been limited. More 
readily available is literature regarding the controversy and effectiveness of the contract, 
detailing the growing professional distaste for such documents. As it is important to the 
understanding of how universities carry out policy ideas, the administration of antisuicide 
contracts merits an in-depth exploration. The documents themselves go by a number of 
names: the suicide-prevention contract, no-harm contract, contracting for safety, among 
others. I will be using these names interchangeably throughout this chapter. Due to its 
informal nature, there is no standard name or form for no-harm agreements and rarely can 
mention of them be found in policy documents (either those of medical or academic 
institutions). And yet, such an agreement can be used as an enactment of policy, a 
diagnostic tool through which policy decisions can be carried out. In essence, the 
antisuicide contract is an informal agreement between caretaker and patient that has the 
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appearance of a more formal document. The wording of the document can vary but by 
nature, it has the patient agree that they will not self-harm, nor will they take their own 
life, by way of signature. It is generally administered soon after suicidal ideation is made 
apparent (or is suspected) and in a clinical environment, is a lead-in to proper assessment, 
followed by therapeutic treatment. Should the patient refuse to sign the document, this 
indicates that the patient can not be trusted with their own safety and immediate 
intervention must be considered. If signed, the document allows for the responsibility of 
safety to be placed, in part, in the hands of the patient and follow-up treatment may be 
less urgent.  
In practice, at the university level, the contract is not only administered by the 
mental health service but can be administered by people other than health care 
professionals—residence dons and deans are among those who have administered such 
documents in Canadian universities, as I’ve discussed in the literature review. In short, 
the antisuicide contract is a tool that allows institutions to take a legalistic approach to 
mental health and pass responsibility for the student’s well-being to the student. It is 
through this practice that neo-liberal values that may not have been evident in the 
university’s stated policy come forward. 
 The antisuicide contract was first put to clinical use in the late 60s to early 70s 
and was developed based on theories of Eric Berne, who had published on the topic in the 
early 50s through the early 60s (the most prominent work being Games People Play – 
The Basic Handbook of Transactional Analysis [1964]). Berne theorized that people 
communicate primarily through assumed roles and states of being. There exist three 
primary roles: adult, parent and child. All communication patterns are based on some 
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interaction between these roles. For instance, adult-to-adult communication is done 
through an exchange of logic and reasoning. In this model, confronting someone about a 
gambling addiction could be phrased as We should figure out why you keep falling back 
into this problem before you hurt the people around you and the expected response would 
be one of understanding: Yes, I’d like to find out why this is happening. Child responses 
would be those of defiance (You don’t understand!), while parent responses would be 
those of concern (I don’t want to hurt anyone but I don’t know how to stop). Berne argues 
that those suffering from a mental illness are operating in the child state and are 
appealing to a protective caretaker in the parent state for assistance. The contract he 
devised is based around the premise that if the patient is brought into an adult-adult 
conversational mode, they will be more rational concerning their own safety. As long as 
this adult state holds, he reasons, the contract will act as a “holding device,” keeping the 
patient alive until further intervention can occur (Berne, 1964). What is troubling is that 
over the past three decades (or more), the form of the contract and the ideology 
surrounding it has not evolved beyond this original work. In hindsight, surely, the notion 
of conversational states is as outdated as Freudian thought and is not without its 
patronizing language (one does not typically think of modern patients as childlike). 
While the language of the no-harm contracts varies from document to document, 
there is a focus that remains consistent across cases. While hardly any Canadian 
university provides samples of the contract for the public, there are plenty of publicly 
available contracts from psychiatric firms and clinics that can be used for comparison (for 
example, Paraklesis Counseling in Calgary hosts an excellent example on their website). 
Between these sample documents and the contracts discussed by researchers such as 
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Buelow and Range (2001), it is evident that there is common language between clinical 
contracts and those used in university settings.  
I would like to discuss an example of an antisuicide contract provided by one of 
the universities investigated for this thesis. The university in question uses two forms of 
the contract: one for students who live outside the campus residence and one for students 
who live on-campus. I was provided with the latter document by the coordinator of the 
university residences (my request for the former document through the university’s 
mental health centre received no response). According to the university’s residence 
guidelines website, the contract is put to regular use as a prominent step in intervention 
for mental health cases in residence. Note that this document was not publicly available 
and needed to be requested specifically. Items enclosed in triangle brackets (i.e., 
<text>) are common throughout all versions of the residence no-harm contract.   
Text enclosed in curly brackets (i.e., {text}) are present in the contract only if they 
are deemed applicable to the situation at hand. The only modification I made to the 
contract from the version that was presented to me was that I excluded any 
information identifying the university or staff involved. 
Of note in this document is the intimidating language that threatens eviction for 
failure to comply with the contract’s terms: “in order for you to remain living in 
residence, I need you to adhere to the following conditions” and the more explicit 
“Possible consequences of violating this behaviour contract include suspension or 
eviction from residence.” The contract seems to be written with the notion that the 
student the contract is intended for is in complete control of their behaviour and that the  
offending incident was not a symptom of an illness. The contract refers to itself as a  
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<date> 
 
<full name> 
< residence address> <extension> 
 
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
 
Dear <first name> 
 
As per our discussion <date of meeting>, I am outlining our expectations of you for 
your continued stay in residence. You recently <details of incident i.e. made an 
attempt to take your own life; harmed yourself> and <responder i.e. roommates, 
RLS member, CSS> came to your aid.  <They/he/she have/has> expressed concern 
for you.  
 
I really would like to see you continue living in residence and your situation is 
important to me. I want to make you aware of the services available to you that will 
be able to offer you appropriate support.  I need for you to accept and use that 
support so that we can be assured that you are getting the assistance you need and 
are more able to cope with the difficulties you’re experiencing. As such, in order for 
you to remain living in residence, I need you to adhere to the following conditions: 
 
<You must agree, with your signature, that you will not make an attempt to take 
your own life; should you feel that you want to do so, you are to seek professional 
support or contact a member of the RLS. If you are distressed and it is after hours, 
you will call the regional crisis line number, ******, or use any of your other outlets 
as discussed.> 
 
• {You must agree, with your signature, that you will not expose other residence 
students to your thoughts of suicide.} 
 
• {You must agree, with your signature, that you will not expose other residence 
students to your self-harm behaviour.} 
 
• {You must agree, with your signature, to refrain from the consumption of alcohol 
in residence until <date>.} 
 
• {You must agree, with your signature, to attend at least one session with a 
personal counsellor in the Student Development Centre (SDC). Their extension is 
****. You must make this appointment within the next 24 hours.} 
 
• {You must agree, with your signature, to continue to attend sessions with your 
present counsellor or health-care provider.}  
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• {You must agree, with your signature, to attend at least one appointment with a 
healthcare professional at Student Health Services. Their extension is ****. You 
must make this appointment within the next 24 hours.} 
 
• {You must agree with your signature, that the Student Development Centre has 
permission to share, with me, the status of your attendance at the appointment you 
have agreed to above.  They will only be asked to verify that you have made and 
attended your appointment; they are not required to disclose any other 
information to me.} 
 
If any concern is raised again about your behaviour, including any violation of the 
above conditions and/or violations of the Residence Agreement or the Residence 
Community Guiding Principles, we will re-assess whether or not residence is the 
place for you.  Possible consequences of violating this behaviour contract include 
suspension or eviction from residence. 
 
<first name>, I was very glad to have the opportunity to meet with you the [sic] 
today.  I hope that our meeting helped you to feel heard and will help get you on the 
road to better health. We have put these conditions in place because we are 
concerned about you and wish to support you.  These conditions will remain in 
place for the duration of your stay in residence.  It is my sincere hope that you are 
able to get the help that you need in order to continue to be successful, both in 
residence and at  ***.  If you have any questions, don’t hesitate to call me at 
extension <extension #>. 
 
I wish you the best of luck for the future. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
<full name> 
Residence Life Coordinator   
 
My signature below indicates that I have read, understand and agree to abide 
by the conditions as set out in this letter. 
 
 
_____________________________   __________________________ 
<name>      Date 
 
Please keep your copy of this letter and return the signature page in the enclosed 
envelope to my mailbox. 
 
 
Figure 1: Residence antisuicide contract. 
107 
 
 
 
“behaviour contract,” and makes repeated mention of “your behaviour.” The student is 
being asked to take full responsibility for their actions and their own safety, though the 
student may not be responsible nor able to seek further help of their own volition. And 
while the student is required to make appointments with care facilities within 24 hours, 
this certainly does not mean the appointment will actually occur within a 24-hour period 
(this seems incredibly unlikely, in fact, given the overburdened system). In the meantime, 
the contract makes clear the student in crisis is now the one responsible for their own 
safety. It is interesting that the student being given the contract is trusted to be 
responsible for managing their illness as a fully competent adult but their peers and 
classmates, in full in loco parentis, are in need of the university’s protection from the 
student’s offensive behaviour. To that end, the language being used in the contract can 
quite possibly evoke shame in the student the contract is directed towards, as it 
encourages the student to hide their difficulties from others in residence (“You must 
agree, with your signature, that you will not expose other residence students to your 
thoughts of suicide”). Note that this is not suicide or even self-harm behaviour but merely 
thoughts of suicide. While students could be disturbed by exposure to self-harm 
behaviour or suicidal ideation, one wonders if attempting to shelter others from the 
troubled student is worth causing further distress to the student who has already engaged 
in self-harm or has attempted suicide. Likely the student’s actual suicide would disturb 
dorm-mates more than the student’s attempts to discuss the problem. I imagine students 
with physical illnesses are not asked to similarly hide possibly distressing symptoms from 
other students and while I am genuinely curious, I am aware of no documentation to this 
effect. 
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Ultimately, the emphasis in this document, as in all no-harm contracts, is on the 
prevention of death, as most documents expressly forbid harm or death by suicide under 
any circumstances. Obviously there is nothing inherently wrong with wishing to prevent 
further harm to students, provided, of course, that the document actually has preventative 
ability. Unfortunately, despite its widespread use, it remains unclear whether the no-harm 
contract is useful in actually preventing harm. While some studies have found beneficial 
results from using the contracts, these studies are done (out of ethical and logical 
necessity) without random sampling and without a control group, so it is impossible to 
differentiate between positive effects of the document and the treatment immediately 
following it. Some researchers have supported longer, more legalistic contracts as a 
means to ensure patients understand what is required of them. In a study of college 
students, participants were asked to rate a number of suicide prevention treatments on 
their effectiveness (Buelow & Range, 2001). Among the treatments were medication, talk 
therapy, self-help methods and a variety of antisuicide contracts that varied from very 
simple and informal to complex and legalistic. A majority of students were found to be in 
favour of longer, more complex and legally phrased documents, preferring them over 
simple, one to two sentence agreements in preventing suicidality and (paradoxically), 
students perceived longer documents as providing the patient a greater level of personal 
control than simpler documents. It is possible the students had simply associated longer 
and more legalistic contracts with professional and therefore effective tools. 
Unfortunately for the validity of this study, only 40% of the 112 respondents had ever 
experienced suicidal thoughts or knew someone who did and it was unclear if any of 
them had any experience with suicide contracting. Interestingly, the students still ranked 
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antisuicide contracts as the weakest tool for suicide prevention available (medication 
being ranked the highest).  
In the last decade, as more research has emerged, more recent authors have 
disagreed with the practice of contracting, arguing the document may even have a 
counterproductive effect (Rudd, Mandrusiak, & Joiner, 2006). One author points to a 
41% fatality rate following the administration of the contract at a university over the 
period of 5 years (it is far from infallible, as even the contract’s defenders have agreed) 
and goes on to suggest that the contract is a potentially coercive administrative tool rather 
than a clinical tool (Weiss, 2001). This latter point is perhaps the most relevant here: 
Does this discussion boil down to an issue of legal liability? 
To answer that question, we must explore the possibility that no-harm contracts 
are indeed used as effective clinical tools. It is rare to find a study that endorses the 
contract’s effectiveness without some kind of caveat. “No-Suicide Contracts: An 
Overview and Recommendations” is one such cautiously optimistic study (Range et al., 
2002). The authors claim that no-harm contracts have the potential to “deepen 
commitment to a positive action, strengthen the therapeutic alliance, facilitate 
communication, lower anxiety, aid assessment and document precautions" (p. 51). 
Despite this extensive list of endorsements, the authors also concede that completely 
contrary attributes of the contract may exist: "They can anger or inhibit the client, 
introduce coercion into therapy, be used disingenuously and induce false security in the 
clinician" (p. 52). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a document that is both coercive and 
yet able to facilitate communication, or both anger the patient and reduce anxiety. 
Obviously, these qualities must be mutually exclusive.  
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Range et al. (2002) ultimately endorse the limited use of antisuicide contracts, so I 
examine the proposed advantages they identify in these contracts. They argue that 
because the formulation of the contract includes alternative coping plans, the documents 
help clients commit to positive action. I would note, however, that while it is undeniable 
that contracts help patients agree to positive courses of action, what is at question is how 
much is truly agreement and how much is coercion, as authors such as Weiss (2001) have 
suggested. Range et al. also argue that contracts are useful as a measure of suicide risk. 
They claim that hesitation and reluctance are indicative of a high suicide risk and 
confidence and eye contact indicate a low risk. This is a dangerous assumption for 
clinicians to make. By the author’s own admission that contracts may be coercive  if only 
due to the power differential between patient and therapist (p. 66), a lack of hesitation 
may simply be an indication that patients are simply trying to please the clinicians. 
Practicing psychologist and researcher Lisa Lewis (2007) conducted an excellent 
literature review on the topic of no-harm contracts, finding that the overwhelming 
majority of literature came down against the use of contracts despite their widespread 
use. In her review, she claimed, “the existing research does not support the use of such 
contracts as a method for preventing suicide, nor for protecting clinicians from 
malpractice litigation in the event of a client suicide" (p. 50). 
Even if it could be proven that no-harm contracts are effective, they remain 
problematic. It isn’t just independent researchers criticizing the documents. The Centre 
for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH; Canada’s largest mental health and addictions 
hospital, as well as a world-leading research institution in the field of mental health) 
argues that the use of these contracts should be discouraged for clinical use wherever 
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possible (Suicide Prevention and Assessment Handbook, 2010). Their conclusion is 
drawn not only from the lack of evidence surrounding the contract’s effectiveness in 
reducing the risk of suicide but also logistical factors. They note that administrators of the 
no-harm contact can derive little information from a signed contract. Patients may agree 
to the terms out of a wish to hide signs of suicidality, or out of perceived obligation, or 
merely to please the clinician but with no genuine belief that they can meet the terms of 
the contract and keep themselves safe. Further, whether signed or not, antisuicide 
contracts are not legal documents, though they can misleadingly appear as such to an 
uninformed patient (or even uninformed care provider). Most shockingly, the CAMH 
points out that the contracts “are sometimes used without evaluation by psychiatrist or 
assessment, a practice that is not suggested” (Centre for Addictions and Mental Health, 
2010, p. 24).  
University researchers are quick to address other issues inherent in these 
documents. For instance, the review “The 'No Suicide Contract': Helpful or Harmful?” 
presents the following concern: “The patient may be experiencing command 
hallucinations to kill himself or herself—a fairly common phenomenon in schizophrenia, 
which has a suicide rate of approximately 10%. Would we be contracting then with the 
individual or with a hallucination”? (Egan, Rivera, Robillard, & Hanson, 1997, p. 32). In 
the same vein, are we holding mentally ill patients responsible for their impulsivity or 
lack of control? Must we introduce another level of stress, guilt and obligation to an 
already traumatic illness? Let us not forget that 90% of those who complete suicide have 
some form of diagnosable mental disorder (Weiss, 2001).  In cases of depression, the 
intensity of the illness can vary wildly as episodes come and go. Dissociative, borderline 
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disorders and active psychosis pose similar problems during a variety of altered states. 
This is not to say that victims of mental disorders cannot be contracted with effectively. 
My point is merely that the most at-risk group for suicide (the mentally ill), for whom the 
contract is intended, is also the most problematic for the contract to adequately service. 
Why, then, have these documents continued to see use in institutions both medical 
and academic despite the controversy? The simple explanation is that many practitioners 
are under the impression these documents will aid in the prevention of malpractice suits 
(Lewis, 2007). Of course, there is little research to indicate that the documents are 
effective at doing even this—indeed, quite the opposite has been found (Gutheil, 1992). 
They are, after all, not legally binding documents and they afford practically no legal 
protection despite the apparent hope that they will. Yet, there is no doubt that these 
contracts have been seen as a protective practice. For instance, Farrow (2002) asked 
nurses about their use of the contract. The nurses’ responses were telling: The mitigation 
of liability was one of the most common responses. As one nurse responded, “I mean the 
thing about contracting for safety [NSCs] is for us it’s butt covering . . . the person has 
verbally contracted, so in a way if they go ahead and kill themselves we have done our 
bit” (p. 216). In the case of nurses, their fear would not be of malpractice allegations but 
of Serious Incident Review inquiries. Administrators who audit the nurse’s behaviour 
through SIR inquiries are evidently, according to the nurses themselves, put at ease by the 
mention of the contract being used: “Certainly when it comes to a SIRPs [Serious 
Incident Review] panel, they like to see it [the presence of a NSC] in the notes. They like 
to see that this person has been offered a contract” (p. 216). It is worth nothing that in 
Farrow’s study, none of the nurses in question had received any formal training on the 
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use of antisuicide contracts, yet all formulated and administered the contracts in a similar 
way, suggesting the skill was learned through the culture at the hospital.  
In addition to “butt covering,” there is some long-standing perception among 
some health care professionals that the no-harm contract is empowering to the client in 
some way, which could also help explain its prevalence.  In a study by Tony Farrow, 
Alexander Simpson and Helen Warren (2002) entitled "The Effects of the Use of 'No-
Suicide Contracts' in Community Crisis Situations," a number of nurses were again asked 
their thoughts on the no-harm contract. The results were tremendously positive: “They 
[the patient] have some control of what is happening and it’s about the fact that we can 
trust them—we are not going to pick them up and take them to hospital. There is some 
trust; they are taking responsibility” (p. 243). The no-harm contract, to their mind, allows 
the patient to take charge of his or her own feelings, reduces anxiety and aids in rapport 
building between patient and caretaker. Yet, this potential strength of the contract 
disappears when examined too closely.  
As a follow-up to this study, Farrow et al. (2002) interviewed patients at the same 
institution at which the nurses were employed. Patients overwhelmingly found the 
antisuicide contracts intimidating, anxiety inducing and disempowering. The transferral 
of responsibility to the patient that nurses saw as a positive factor, the patients saw as 
overwhelming and a particularly uncaring act on the part of the professionals. The 
patients felt as if they were being held solely responsible for their own care and safety, 
when they had expected a professional to assist them further. One patient noted: “It [the 
introduction of the NSC] made them [the crisis team clinicians] seem very cold and just 
there to do their job and that is it . . . just ‘hurry up and get out of the way’” (p. 243). 
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Further, all patients interviewed believed that the contracts were really a false choice, as 
refusing to sign the contract would have meant some kind of escalated intervention. In 
their case, at the institution in question, they would have been correct. To refuse the 
contract would have been an indication that further intervention was required, which is 
the generally held practice with no-harm contracts. Of little help are the preconceptions 
of the very term “contract,” which bring to mind legal procedure and serious 
consequences. The patients voiced their fears and concerns: “You know what’s going to 
happen if you say no . . . It’s like they pretend to give you a choice” (p. 243). Other 
patients agreed that they felt compelled to sign the contract. “I thought this [agreeing to 
the NSC] was the only choice . . . I didn’t know I could refuse, or what other choice there 
was” and “It was like, this is what happens now . . . what other choice was there?” (p. 
244). Other concerns included not being taken seriously enough and a feeling of forced 
distance from the administering caretaker.  
Though the no-harm document is more informal than the legal contracts it apes, 
clearly there are ethical issues inherent in a contract that an individual feels he or she 
must sign under duress, be it for the patient’s own good or not. The authors commented 
on the phenomenon, “It appears that the very formulation of the NSC [no-suicide contact] 
reduced their ability to receive full information about their treatment possibilities and 
their right to refuse or accept these treatments as they saw fit.” (p. 246). They also saw 
the idea of entrusting patients with their own care before determining their existing 
coping skills—and before providing them with those skills through treatment—as absurd. 
As a diagnostic tool, then, to separate urgent care (those who refuse to sign) from the 
calm and manageable patients, the contract runs into more problems. The authors explain:  
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Persons who are at serious risk of suicide and with whom a NSC could be 
considered as useful for management, are less likely to be truly competent to enter 
a NSC. Yet persons at low risk of suicide and who may be considered competent, 
are not likely to need a contract at all. (p. 248).  
Again, we have seen that patients can easily sign antisuicide contracts for a number of 
reasons, including perceived obligation or a desire to avoid hospitalization, among other 
reasons. To those who need the document, signing indicates nothing. For that matter, 
refusal to sign may simply indicate a fear of the contract, distrust of the administrator, an 
inability to trust one’s own actions at a future time (but feeling safe in the short term), or 
the understanding that the distress is temporary and no contract is needed. These 
scenarios may not be the norm but they are plausible enough that contracting as a 
diagnostic tool should be supplemented with a professional eye and a series of 
nonthreatening questions. Clinicians (ideally) can use the patient’s body language and 
situational context to help with preliminary diagnoses. One wonders, then, what 
information the patient’s signature adds to the process that the clinician’s training cannot 
discern. 
If these contracts are perceived by all except those who administer them as cold 
and legalistic, or as blatantly ineffective, where is the miscommunication? Or are the best 
interests of the patients being ignored for the sake of protecting against legal backlash? 
Rudd et al. (2006), authors of “The Case Against No-Suicide Contracts,” offer an easy, 
sensible alternative to the existing document, which they call a commitment to treatment 
statement. In this model, the term “contract” is removed to avoid negative connotations. 
More importantly, the commitment to treatment statement (CTS) does not deny the 
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patient the option of suicide, as this, the authors feel, is an unreasonable request of an 
early clinician–patient relationship and one that, they note, results in an increase in 
suicidality. Trusting a patient, the authors suggest, involves not saddling them with 
responsibility but trusting that they can take care of themselves without the use of a 
patronizing or anxiety-inducing document. A CTS instead states the goals of treatment in 
clear language and has the patient agree only to a duration of treatment they feel is 
appropriate and that their clinician will be contacted in case of emergencies. This is not to 
say a CTS solves all the issues of contracting—in particular, it can still be seen as a 
largely administrative procedure, though now its clinical intentions are more apparent. It 
would nevertheless be a step forward in the field.  Unfortunately, however, no such 
model has been adopted in over 50 years of using contracts, so it seems unlikely that the 
practice will change soon.  
While the clinical world is one thing, the use of antisuicide contracts in 
postsecondary institutions is even more problematic. Care professionals know to follow 
up the document with proper assessment (ideally) and may even be aware of growing 
clinician distaste for the practice but deans and administrative officials, attracted to the 
legalistic nature of the contract, may not be aware that further follow-up is needed. 
Worse, believing that symptoms of mental illness derive solely from stressful 
environments (discounting the possibility that mental illness increases sensitivity to 
stress), administrators (or overworked campus mental health staff) may feel students in 
need may have all the skills required to take their safety into their own hands after a mere 
promise and some time off. Even assuming administrators are knowledgeable enough to 
overcome these difficulties, the academic environment features unique challenges to 
117 
 
 
 
contracting. One such challenge and perhaps the reason why the academic world took so 
readily to the use of legalistic contracts, is the deep-rooted tradition of using informal 
contracts to treat delinquent behaviour (Buelow & Range, 2001). There is evidence to 
suggest low academic productivity, truancy and disruptive behaviour have been treated 
successfully by contracting not unlike no-harm contracts and there exists a tradition of 
their use that predates the no-suicide agreement. The problem, of course, lies in the belief 
that suicidal ideation is in some way a delinquent behaviour that benefits from client-
patient negotiations. It is not the case that the mentally ill are acting out of rebellion or 
need for attention (an outdated but still extant model of the problem) and until assessment 
can be completed, it should not be assumed as such. Overcoming this tradition, lacking in 
the clinical world (save, perhaps, for addictions treatment—though even this kind of 
contracting is a less common practice than no-harm contracts), is a challenge for 
administrators unfamiliar with mental illness, or who are stuck in a behavioural model of 
disorders. We have no reason to believe administrators or even on-campus mental health 
staff understand the limitations of the no-harm contract. In a survey of Harvard’s own 
mental health faculty, it was found that 61% of psychiatrists and 71% of psychologists 
who used contracting were not trained in their use at any point in their careers (Weiss, 
2001). Expecting residence dons or nonmedical staff to have any kind of training on the 
document’s use is unreasonable and yet, the practice of nonmedical faculty to administer 
no-harm contracts is still common.  
With questionable use as a suicide prevention tool and unclear utility as a 
diagnostic tool, what use is the no-harm contract? While it evidently holds no weight in 
court as a legal tool, I have discussed how the form (and name) of the document has 
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served to intimidate patients and lead them to believe the contract is somehow binding. I 
would argue that administrators can use the no-harm contract as a tool to dissuade legal 
action through sheer bluff. Families of suicide victims could be just as easily fooled by 
such a contract into believing therapeutic efforts were further underway than they were in 
reality (after all, the suicide victim had enough of a therapeutic rapport to enter into the 
agreement), or that the institution has possession of a legal document that could be used 
in court. Should the administrator of the contract be more genuine in his or her concern, it 
is no less a display of neo-liberal values. The form of the contract has remained a 
legalistic one, despite critics’ attempts to soften or humanize the language, with some 
authors even pushing for more bureaucratic language. The act of bureaucratizing mental 
health is an audit of our very therapeutic tools and even the patient is lured into the 
anxiety and responsibility surrounding a legalistic audit. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Policy is one of the most important tools administrators have for establishing (or 
at least, defining) a relationship with their student population. Author Michael Apple 
(2001) believes that the neo-liberal (and neo-conservative) model adopted by policy 
makers in higher education has changed this relationship between student and 
administrator and not for the better. His idea that neo-liberal values are at play at all 
levels of the institution helps to make sense of the move towards legalistic mental health 
policy, as well as trends in existing policy. Legalistic policy such as contracting and 
policy construed to mitigate liability, by necessity, distances university staff from their 
students. This is while, paradoxically, the institution advertises the quality of their on-
campus care. As competition between increasingly capitalist universities escalates, it is 
all the more important that institutions protect their reputations—they wish to present an 
image of care and responsibility while simultaneously taking on only the minimal level of 
responsibility for mental health issues, in fear of legal backlash. Another element of 
policy that has clear hallmarks of neo-liberal thought is a repeated mention of cost as a 
limitation on the improvement of services. This is apparent in developing frameworks 
like those of Carleton University and while there can be little doubt that cost is a factor 
for all university programs, it should perhaps be less of a concern where services to save 
lives could be integrated or improved. 
This tension between keeping up appearances with their consumer base and 
maintaining a legalistic stance on the institution’s responsibility to students is evident in 
current policy concepts. Modern policy concerning the extent of a university’s duty of 
care is a careful hybrid between in loco parentis (“in place of the parent,” where the 
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university holds many of the same rights and responsibilities towards students that 
parents would) and a more distant, bystander-like framework. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that the evolution of policy from in loco parentis to a bystander era to a 
cautious rehash of in loco parentis once more mirrors Power’s (1994) history of the 
evolution of capitalist thought in higher education. As the age of the bystander ended, so 
too did universities begin to adopt more businesslike tactics and policies. In loco parentis 
became a demand of the consumer (or in some cases, the parents of the consumer), one 
that could be placated, at least in part, through policy. Recall from my previous 
discussion that this does not mean that universities necessarily adopted in loco parentis 
but rather created policies to attempt to satisfy customers’ needs for safety and still keep 
themselves at arm’s length from potentially damaging backlash.  
 When university policy is put into practice through the use of policy tools, the 
neo-liberal values are much more straightforward and visible. In this review, I looked at 
the policy tool of the no-harm contract. Among the problems of the practice (not the least 
of which was a lack of medical credibility) is the use of the contract by administrators 
rather than medical professionals and the cold legalistic nature of the contract (off-putting 
to students in need). Safety contracting is a form of auditing behaviour directed at 
mentally ill students, a means of controlling what some administrators view as 
undesirable or delinquent behaviour. The preference for this quick, cheap, easy, yet 
coldly legal procedure over more humanistic alternatives (improvements to overburdened 
health care services, for instance) points to an audit culture inherent in higher education. 
 The vast majority of mental health policy remains in development and there is 
little to no mental health policy precedent in Canada for universities to follow. Because 
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there is little history to guide the formulation of policy documents in Ontario and many 
frameworks seem to have already fallen into troubling language, it is unclear if the final 
product will have the quality it needs, or if mere lip service will be paid to the problem at 
hand. However, some developing policies are quite promising and it gives one hope that 
with further refinement, these policies will change the face of mental health in Ontario 
universities.  
 After reading what limited literature is available, reviewing existing policy 
documents, and researching the real-life consequences for students caught up in an 
ineffective system, I do have some insights on what effective mental health policy may 
look like. Effective, here, means simply that the policy document helps to ensure that the 
issues of students who are suffering from a mental illness are not exacerbated by the 
actions of the university, and ultimately reduces the likelihood of student suicide (and by 
extension, reduces the likelihood of lawsuits against the university). While I believe that 
there simply isn’t enough research to provide a definite solution to the problem of policy, 
I would like to use this space to speculate. I have identified what I believe are three of the 
most important attributes of an effective policy document. There is some overlap with 
Bowden’s (2007) theorizing on the same issue, much (but not all) of which I agree with. 
My suggestions are presented in no particular order (they are all equally important). 
First, an effective mental health policy document should address the entire 
campus, not merely upgrade or renovate existing mental health resources. Remember that 
while counseling centres are overburdened, they are often not treating the most 
vulnerable group of students: the mentally ill (Wei, 2007). This is likely a problem with 
identification and referral of students in need. Students who already feel like outsiders 
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because of their illness are hardly encouraged by faculty who may not know how to 
address their problem. Effective policy would address the problem at a departmental 
level, providing basic mental health training to faculty, including what mental health 
resources exist and when it is appropriate to refer students to them. Training is even more 
important in campus residences. This is where the symptoms of a student’s illness are all 
the more visible, and it falls to residence dons to understand what the student is going 
through and the best way to assist them. Operating on a case-by-case basis is simply not 
good enough, and introduces personal bias into the system. Administrators are not mental 
health experts, and they will need a clear guideline for operating procedure. In short, it is 
important that the document does not focus solely on the counseling centre, but how the 
entire university can work towards solving mental health problems. 
Secondly, I believe it is important that policy makes a distinction between mental 
illness and mental health, with at least consideration given to medical models of 
treatment being implemented on-campus. Students cannot be expected to have access to 
outside help—experts should be available on-campus who can offer treatment beyond 
talk therapy. If these experts must be kept at arm’s length from the university for legal 
reasons, so be it. Ideally, it would be preferable if the university could keep in close 
communication with its experts to better monitor a student’s state of mind and how it 
may impact their academic career, but there must be some concession to legal concerns. 
Related, the language used in the policy document should make clear that issues like 
depression and suicidality are health issues, not disciplinary problems. The policy 
document should take pains to divorce itself from the university’s code of conduct, and 
particularly from the idea that mentally ill people are dangerous and should be isolated. 
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Policy makers should remember that pedagogy shapes thought, and an effective policy 
document frames the issue in a way that does not alienate or insult students.  
Finally, effective policy must outline what responsibility the institution has to 
addressing the mental health needs of a given student, and to what extent the university 
will take action to protect itself from legal repercussions. I do not mean to say that 
universities cannot use policy to protect themselves legally, but I do believe the primary 
purpose of the document should be to ensure that all reasonable efforts are being taken to 
accommodate students who suffer from mental illness. It should not set out to be a legal 
shield—doing so sets up an opposition between students and administrators, which is 
counter-productive to providing reasonable levels of care. At bare minimum, the authors 
of the hypothetical policy document should make a commitment to addressing mental 
illness problems on-campus, rather than removing the student from it. Other primarily 
legalistic practices, like the anti-suicide contract, would not be part of standard operating 
procedure on any level. Of course, the document should recognize that less obvious 
legalistic practices exist, but are equally dangerous: in particular, the use of the 
counseling centre as a holding-tank. A mental health centre should not be expected to 
solve all of a mentally ill student’s woes, especially if its primary means of treatment is 
counseling. Counseling alone cannot be considered an adequate level of care. While a 
university may not be a health care facility (and I am in no way expecting it to be), it is 
that very lack of expertise that leads to false positive identification and, moreover, 
campus tragedy. Effective policy would examine care options that provide some middle 
ground between counseling as a first response and hospital-level care, while still 
providing some degree of legal protection for administrators and faculty. Ideally, policy-
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makers would minimize neoliberal influence and open the institution up to some amount 
of legal liability in exchange for a more comprehensive level of student care. 
To conclude, it is the hope of this review that policy of some sort will soon be in 
place to replace existing practices, many of which are clearly problematic. While I 
understand that my study has not put forward a definite solution to problematic policy, I 
feel that given the lack of literature on the subject, identifying that the problem exists is 
valuable. I also hope that I have identified gaps in the research, as there are a great 
number of questions that remain unanswered. What are the opinions of students on 
mental health policy? What do policy makers have to say on policy development? Future 
research should expand upon this work, especially to test whether my findings hold true 
across all of Canada. Further, I believe this paper serves an archival purpose, 
documenting the state of university mental policy in Ontario in early 2016. Considering 
the developing state of mental health policy, these documents may look very different in 
the years to come. 
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